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I. INTRODUCTION
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
("Dodd-Frank Act") was signed into law on July 21, 2010.1 Beginning in
2007, U.S. financial conditions deteriorated, leading to the near collapse
of the U.S. financial system in September 2008. Major banks, insurers,
government-sponsored enterprises, and investment banks either failed or
required hundreds of billions in federal support to continue functioning.2
Congress responded to the crisis by enacting the most comprehensive
financial reform legislation since the 1930s. The Dodd-Frank Act states
its purpose is "to promote the financial stability of the United States by
improving accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end
'too big to fail,' to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to
protect consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other
purposes."' Under Section 951 of the Dodd-Frank Act, public companies
are required to conduct an "advisory" (non-binding) shareholder vote
(generally known as a "say on pay" vote) at least once every three years to
approve the compensation of a company's executive officers.' Section 951
also mandates that every six years a company must ask shareholders
whether the "say on pay" vote should be held every one, two, or three
* Professorial Lecturer in Law, George Washington University Law School, Attorney-
Advisor/Judicial Law Clerk, Board of Veterans' Appeals, Department of Veterans Affairs, Managing
Associate Editor, Wealth Strategies Journal, Articles Editor, Veterans Law Review, Member, Legal
Writing Institute.
I Dodd-FrankAct, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
2 Baird Webel, The Dodd-Frank Wa Street Refotn and Consurer Proation Act: LmIs and Summary,
Congressional Research Service (July 29, 2010).
3 Id.
4 Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
5 Id. at 5 951 (Section 951 of the Dodd-Frank Act amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(Exchange Act) by adding Section 14A (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 5 78n-1)).
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years.' The compensation arrangements subject to the "say on pay" vote
are those set out in Item 402 of Regulation S-K, which includes all
compensation paid to the Chief Executive Officer ("CEO"), Chief
Financial Officer ("CFO"), and the three other highest paid executive
officers.'
The article begins by providing a history of "say on pay" votes and
examining the "say on pay" provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act. The
article transitions into a discussion of how the Dodd-Frank "say on pay"
provisions are currently being utilized by shareholders in derivative
lawsuits. Specifically, the article will analyze in detail the legal theories
raised and remedies sought by the litigants and discuss, in detail, the only
three post-Dodd-Frank decisions that have been handed down by courts
to date. Based on this analysis, the article provides recommendations for
companies on how to re-write their "pay for performance" executive
compensation policies and how to respond positively and actively to a
negative "say on pay" vote on executive compensation. The article
concludes by proposing an amendment to the Dodd-Frank Act which, if
promulgated, would provide that a second successive negative "say on
pay" vote (50% or more of shareholder votes cast against the proposed
executive compensation package) on executive compensation would
prompt a vote on a "spill" resolution and, if that resolution passes, all
directors, except for the managing director, must stand for re-election at a
special "spill" meeting within 90 days of the annual shareholder meeting
where the "spill" resolution passed.
II. DODD-FRANK ACT: "SAY ON PAY" PROVISIONS
A. History of "Say on Pay" Votes
"Say on Pay" votes are relatively new in the United States, but have
been used internationally since the late 1990's.' In July 1999, Stephen
Byers, a former United Kingdom (U.K) Secretary of State for Trade and
Industry, stated that the U.K government needed to "recognize that in a
global economy world class performance must be rewarded with world
6 Id.
7 Id.
Paul Hodgson, A Brief History of Say on Pay, GMI RATINGS (Oct. 1, 2009),
http//blog.thecorporatelibrary.con/blog/2009/10/a-brief-history-of-say-on-pay.html.
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class pay," but also that "there need[ed] to be a clear link between pay and
performance."'
Former Secretary Byers proposed a plan to provide shareholders with
more power and play a more active role in the running of a company."o
The plan consisted of five options that he believed would give
shareholders a greater role in setting executive compensation: (1) require a
vote at the annual meeting on the remuneration committee's report; (2)
require companies to publish a remuneration policy for approval by
shareholders; (3) require annual re-election of company directors; (4)
require annual election of the chairman of the remuneration committee;
(5) draft new procedures which would allow shareholders to put forward
resolutions on pay."
Based in part on former Secretary Byers plan, the U.K government
enacted The Directors' Remuneration Report Regulations in 2002.12
These regulations included the requirement to put a remuneration report
to a shareholder vote at each annual meeting." The shareholder vote,
which was advisory, amounted to a "confidence vote on the work of the
compensation committee, focusing in particular on executive
compensation levels in light of performance and other factors.""
Following the U.K, Australia (2004) and Spain (2007) enacted
regulations requiring non-binding shareholder votes on remuneration
reports." Countries including the Netherlands (2004), Sweden (2007),
Denmark (2007), and Norway (2007) have enacted regulations requiring
companies to submit remuneration reports to a binding vote.' Under
these regulations, shareholders gain greater decision-making powers.
These "say on pay" regulations from different jurisdictions will be
discussed in further detail later in this article."
9 Business: The Economy Crackdown as 'Fat Cat' Pay Soars, BBC NEWS (July 19, 1999),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hVbusiness/398040.stm.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Directors' Remuneration Report Regulations 2002 (S.I. 2002/1986) (U.K), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2002/1986/pdfs/uksi_20021986 en.pdf.
13 See id.
14 Jeffrey N. Gordon, Executive Compensation: If There's A Problem, What's the Remedy? The Case
for "Compensation Discussion and Analysis," 30J. CORP. L. 675, 699 (2005).
Is Michel Magnan and Claudine Mangen, "Is Say on Pay an Effective Govenance Tool?" Report
submitted to the Institute for the Governance of Public and Private Organizations.
16 Id.
17 See infra Section V(D).
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As noted above, "say on pay" votes in the United States are relatively
new. Escala Group, a global collectibles company, issued a proxy
statement in October 2005, stating that the company would put executive
compensation packages up for a shareholder vote." Congress has also
tried to pass legislation mandating "say on pay" votes on executive
compensation. In November 2005, Representative Barney Frank
introduced a bill that would require Congress to amend the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act") to require additional disclosure to
shareholders of executive compensation. 9 It would also require a separate
shareholder vote to approve an executive compensation plan; however, it
did not state whether the vote would be binding on a company and its
board of directors.20 In May 2009, Senator Charles Schumer introduced a
bill to provide shareholders with enhanced authority over the nomination,
election, and compensation of public company executives.21 It would also
require a separate shareholder vote to approve an executive compensation
plan, but stated that the vote would be non-binding and would not affect
the fiduciary duties of a company or its board of directors.22 In July 2009,
Representative Barney Frank introduced a bill to amend the Exchange Act
to provide shareholders with a non-binding vote on executive
compensation and to prevent perverse incentives in the compensation
practices of financial institutions.2' None of these bills were enacted into
law.
In July 2009, President Obama signed into law the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009.24 The Recovery Act amended
Section 111(e) of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 200825 to
require "say on pay" votes for companies who received aid from the
United States government under the Troubled Asset Relief Program
(TARP).
18 See Hodgson, supra note 8; see also, EscALA GRouP, 2005 PROXY STATEMENT (2005) (The
company issued a statement noting that the board would put both the outgoing CEO's and the
incoming CEO's compensation packages up for a shareholder vote).
19 See Protection Against Executive Compensation Abuse Act of 2005, H.R. 4291, 109th
Cong. (1st Sess. 2005).
20 Id.
21 See Shareholder Bill of Rights Act of 2009, S. 1074, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009).
2 Id.
2 See Corporate and Financial Institution Compensation Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 3269,
111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009).
24 Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009).
25 Economic Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008).
26 RecoveryAct, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009).
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B. Dodd-Frank Act Section 951 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 5 78n- 1)
1. Legislative History
The proposals for a "say on pay" vote on executive compensation were
initially set forth by the Obama Administration in June 2009 via the
Department of Treasury's "White Paper" on financial reform.27 The
Administration recognized the need for "say on pay" rules, which would
require shareholder votes on executive compensation packages. While
such votes would be non-binding, they would provide "a strong message
to management and boards and serve to support a culture of performance,
transparency, and accountability in executive compensation."2 8 The
Administration believed that legislation authorizing "say on pay" rules for
all public companies could "help restore investor trust by promoting
increased shareholder participation and increasing accountability of board
members and corporate management."" It would provide shareholders of
all public U.S. companies with the same rights that are accorded to
shareholders in many other countries."o Legislators also stated that "say on
pay" votes on executive compensation "serve as a direct referendum on
the decisions of the compensation committee and offer a more targeted
way to signal shareowner discontent than withholding votes from
committee members.",3
The Dodd-Frank Act was initially proposed in Congress on
December 2, 2009, in the House of Representatives by Representative
Barney Frank, and in the Senate by Senator Chris Dodd.32 The original
language of the Dodd-Frank Act provided for a shareholder vote that
would not be binding on a company or its board of directors. The vote
would also not be construed as overruling a decision by the board or
create or imply any additional fiduciary duties on the board." There was
virtually no change in the language of the introduced bill and the final bill
that was enacted into law.34
27 See generally U.S. Treasury Dep't., Financial Regulatory Reform, A New Foundation: Rebuilding
Financial Supervision and Regulation (2009), http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/
FinalReportweb.pdf [hereinafter White Paper].
2 Id. at 73.
29 Id.
3o Id; see also supra, Section II(A).
31 S. Rep. No. 111-176, at 133 (2010).
32 H.R 4173, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009).
C H Id.
34 Compare H.R. 4173, 111Ith Cong. (1st Sess. 2009), with Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
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2. Statutory Language
Section 951 of the Dodd-Frank Act expanded "say on pay" to all
public companies by adding a new Section 14(a) to the Exchange Act."
The statutory language provides: "[at least] once every 3 years, a proxy or
consent or authorization for an annual or other meeting of the
shareholders for which the proxy solicitation rules of the Commission
require compensation disclosure shall include a separate resolution
subject to shareholder vote to approve the compensation of executives.""
The statutory language also provides that: "[at least] once every 6 years, a
proxy or consent or authorization for an annual or other meeting of the
shareholders for which the proxy solicitation rules of the [SEC] require
compensation disclosure shall include a separate resolution subject to
shareholder vote to determine whether ["say on pay"] votes ... will occur
every 1, 2, or 3 years."3 1
The Dodd-Frank Act makes clear that the "say on pay" votes are
merely advisory and are not binding a company's board of directors."
The "say on pay" vote may not be construed as overruling a decision by a
company or its board of directors. It cannot change or add to the fiduciary
duties of a company's board of directors and it may not restrict or limit
the ability of shareholders to make proposals for inclusion in proxy
materials related to executive compensation.3 9
III. SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIE LAWSUITS
Nearly 2,300 companies held "say on pay" votes in 2011.40
Shareholders only returned negative "say on pay" votes at 45, or 1.9%, of
these companies." In a majority of the negative "say on pay" votes, less
and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899.
3s Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L No. 111-203, S 951, 124 Stat 1376 (2010).
36 15 U.S.CA 5 78n-1(a)(1) (West 2002 & Supp. 2011).
37 Id. at§578n-1(a)(2).
38 Id. at 5 78n-1 (c).
3 Id.
4 Dechert LLP, Defnding Against Shareholder 'Say on Pay' Suits, MONDAQ, (Sept. 13, 2011),
httpV/www.mondaq.conunitedstates/x/145050/Corporate+Crime/Defending+Against+Shareholder
+SayOnPay+Suits; see also List: Companies Failing to Obtain Majority Vote on Pay Packages,
COMPENSATIONSTANDARDS.COM, http;//www.compensationstandards.conVMember/Areas/
Advisory.htm#6 (last visited Dec. 20, 2011).
41 Michael R. Lettenberg, et al., The Votes Are In - Deconstructing the 2011 Say on Pay Vote,
ScHULTE ROTH & ZABEL, Uune 17, 2011), http://www.srz.com/files/News/dbf0ba31-2627-402c-
b211-3a6cc3e83295/Presentation/NewsAttachment/643250b0-a583-444c-901 1-
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than 45% of the shareholders voted in favor of the company's executive
compensation package.4 2  Shareholder derivative lawsuits have been
commenced against the board of directors, certain executive officers, and
executive compensation consultants at 7 of the companies that received
negative "say on pay" votes.43
The allegations in the Complaints generally claim that the directors
breached their fiduciary duties by approving executive compensation
packages that shareholders deemed unreasonable and excessive. The
breaches include allegations that "directors diverted corporate assets to the
executives in a manner that put the executives' interests ahead of those of
the shareholders" and "that the companies that have adopted 'pay-for-
performance' compensation policies failed to disclose in their proxy
statements that the compensation awards were made notwithstanding or
in contravention to the policies."" Finally, the complaints also bring
claims for corporate waste based on the alleged excessive size of the
executive compensation awards."
A. Shareholder Derivative Lawsuit Elements
A shareholder's derivative action is an action brought by one or more
shareholders of a corporation to enforce a corporate right or to prevent or
05277889fcle/06281 1_TheVotesAreInDeconstructing the_2011_Say on Pay Vote.pdf; see also
Voting Analytics: An Analysis of Voting Results and Performance at Russell 3000 Companies, EQUILAR (July
2011), http://www.equilar.com/knowledge-network/research-articles/2011/201107-voting-analytics.
php [hereinafter Equilar Report].
42 Pamela B. Greene, et al., Lessons Leamed from Initial 'Say-on-Pay' Litigation: Plaintis'Attorneys
Start Utilizing "No" Votes as a Basis for Claims Against Directors, MARTINDALE.COM, (July 25, 2011),
httpV/www.martindale.com/litigation-law/article-Mintz-Levin-Cohn-Ferris-Glovsky-Popeo-
PC_1316956.htm; see also Ed Hauder, SOP Votes With Less Than 50% Support/Not Approved as of
November 14, 2011, SAY ON PAY (Mar.15, 2011, 11:54 PM), httpV//say-on-pay.con/say-on-pay-
frequency-tracking/.
43 The companies include Jacobs Engineering Group, Inc.; Beazer Homes USA, Inc.;
Umpqua Holdings Corp.; Hercules Offshore, Inc.; Janus Capital Group, Inc.; Cincinnati Bell, Inc.;
and Dex One Corp. See, e.g., Witmer v. Martin, et al., BC454543 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles Cty.,
Feb. 4, 2011) [hereinafter Jacobs Engineering]; Teamsters Local 237 v. McCarthy, et aL, 2011 CV
197841 (Ga. Super. Ct., Fulton Cty., March 15, 2011) [hereinafter Beazer Homes]; Plumbers Local
No. 237 v. Davis, et al., 1 1-cv-633 (D. Ore., May 25, 2011) [hereinafter Umpqua Holdings]; Matthews
v. Rynd, et al, 2011 34508 (Tex. Dist. Ct., Harris Cty., June 8, 2011) [hereinafter Hercules Offshore];
Swanson v. Weil, et al., 11-cv-02142 (D. Col., August 16, 2011) [hereinafterJanus Capital]; NECA-
IBEW Pension Fund v. Cox, et al., I 1-cv-451 (S.D. Ohio, July 5, 2011) [hereinafter Cincinnati Bell];
Haberland v. Bulkeley, 5:1 lcv-00463-D (E.D.N.C, Sept. 1, 2011) [hereinafter Dex One].
4 Greene, supra note 42.
45 Id.
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remedy a wrong to the corporation." In a derivative action, "the
corporation is the real party in interest, and any recovery goes to the
corporation, rather than to the shareholder who brings the action."4 7 The
right of a shareholder to bring a derivative lawsuit "is not a property right
or a vested right and is not beyond the control of the courts or the
legislature; a state has plenary power over stockholders' derivative
actions.""
Shareholder derivative lawsuits generally allege that the company's
directors or officers violated one or more fiduciary duties owed to the
company and its shareholders." Typically, plaintiffs don't seek to extract
monetary damages, but rather they seek to protect their long-term interest
in the company by imposing corporate governance and management
changes."s There are generally two broad categories of breach of fiduciary
duty that underlie derivative actions: duty of loyalty and duty of care."
Shareholders suing derivatively must make demand upon the
corporation's directors to take corrective action, or else state with
particularity the reasons why demand would be futile, before they may
proceed with the action." Even when shareholder derivative claims are
brought under federal law, the substantive law of the state of
incorporation is applied to determine if the failure of the plaintiff to make
a demand is excused." "A demand on the corporate directors, officers, or
managers to bring suit and their wrongful refusal to do so is necessary
before a stockholder may maintain a suit on behalf of the corporation, in
46 19 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations 5 1944 (2011); see also Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co, 330
U.S. 518, 522 (1947) ("The cause of action which [a plaintiff in shareholders' derivative action] brings before
the court is not his own but the corporation's. It is the real party in interest and [the shareholder] is allowed to
act in protection of its interest somewhat as a "next friend" might do for an individual, because it is disabled
from protecting itself").
47 Id.
48 19 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations 5 1959 (2011); see also Cohen v. Benefit Indus. Loan Corp., 337
U.S. 541, 549 (1949) ("[t]he very nature of the stockholder's derivative action makes it one in the
regulation ofwhich the legislature ofa state has wide powers.").
4 See Dave Bradford, Shareholder Deriative Suits A Growing Concern for Corporate Directors and Offiers,
CNAPRO (June 2005), http-//www.cnapro.con/pdf/ShareholderDeriviativeSuitsAdvisen-pdf.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1(b)(3) (the plaintiffs must "(3) state with particularity: (A) any effort by
the plaintiff to obtain the desired action from the directors or comparable authority and, if necessary,
from the shareholders or members; and (B) the reasons for not obtaining the action or not making the
effort.").
s3 See Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Serv. Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 98 (1991); see also United States v.
Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979).
1572012]
158 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS IAWREVIEW [Vol. 20:149
the absence of circumstances excusing the demand."' The demand must
be made before the filing of the action. The purpose of the "demand"
rule is "to give the derivative corporation itself the opportunity to take
over a suit which was brought on its behalf in the first place, and thus to
allow the directors the chance to occupy their normal status as conductors
of the corporation's affairs."s"
The demand requirement for maintaining derivative actions is also
not a mere formality; it is an important aspect of corporate law that limits
the powers of individual shareholders and directors to control corporate
litigation." Demand is excused in situations where the complaint raises "a
reasonable doubt as to (i) director disinterest or independence or (ii)
whether the directors exercised proper business judgment in approving
the challenged transaction."" Demand futility must be determined at the
time the shareholder derivative lawsuit is filed." The application of these
shareholder derivative lawsuit elements will be discussed in further detail
later in this article.'
B. Cases
1. Witmer v. Martin ('Jacobs Engineering")
In the Jacobs Engineering case, a shareholder derivative action was
brought by shareholders on behalf of Jacobs Engineering Group Inc.
("Jacobs Engineering") against Jacobs Engineering's Board of Directors
("Jacobs Board"), certain Jacobs Engineering senior officers, and Jacobs
Engineering's executive compensation consultant, Frederic W. Cook &
Co., Inc. (FWC)." The Complaint seeks to hold defendants liable for
54 19 AM.JUR2DCorporaions 51961 (2011).
55 Id
5 Brody v. Chemical Bank, 517 F.2d 932,934 (2d Cir. 1975); see also Mills v. Esmark, Inc, 91 F.RD.
70, 72 (N.D.Ill. 1981) (the purpose of demand requirement is to allow a corporation to activate mtercorporate
remedies to address shareholder complaints pnor to resorting tojudicial intervention).
5 See FED. R CIV. P. 23.1(b)(3).
5 RCM Securities Fund, Inc. v. Stanton, 928 F.2d 1318, 1330 (2d Cir. 1991) (quoting
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984)) (applying Delaware law); see also Grobow v. Perot,
539 A.2d 180, 188-89 (Del.. 1988) ("The test is disjunctive; demand is excused when the complaint
alleges facts that raise a reasonable doubt as to either director independence or the exercise of proper
business judgment.").
5 Stepakv. Dean, 434 A.2d 388,390 (DeL Ch. 1981); Cramer v. Gen. Tel. & Elec. Corp., 582 F.2d
259, 276 (3d Cir. 1978).
60 See infra Sections l (C) & (D).
61 Complaint at t 1, Witmer v. Martin, No. BC454543 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles Cty filed
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"breach of [] fiduciary duties of candor, good faith and loyalty, and for
corporate waste, unjust enrichment, aiding and abetting, and breach of
contract in connection with the award of excessive and unwarranted 2010
executive compensation."62 The plaintiffs also allege that Jacobs
Engineering's earnings and revenue performance in 2010 was "abysmal;"
however, the Jacobs Board still authorized pay increases for the company's
senior officers in 2010.' In the factual allegations section, the plaintiffs
state that in 2010, Jacobs Engineering's revenues decreased by $1.5 billion
dollars (14%), net earnings decreased $153 million dollars (38.5%), and
earnings per share decreased $1.28 dollars per share (39.3%). 4  The
plaintiffs claim that even though most of the key financial metrics
declined in 2010, executive compensation still increased.
The plaintiffs discuss how Jacobs Engineering's executive
compensation practices are rooted in a "pay for performance" policy. In
the 2011 Proxy Statement, the Jacobs Board represented that the Board's
philosophy was 'to provide a strong link between pay and Company
performance."' They also noted that the Jacobs Board's philosophy
"[was] to establish executive compensation programs that reward superior
performance [and] have consequences for underperformance.""
In Jacobs Engineering's 2011 Proxy Statement, the Jacobs Board
advised shareholders to approve the executive compensation package for
2010.68 In January 2011, a majority of shareholders rejected Jacobs
Engineering's executive compensation package for 2010.69 Even with the
negative vote by the shareholders on executive compensation, the Jacobs
Board did not alter or amend the 2010 executive compensation
structure.70
The plaintiffs allege that a pre-suit demand upon the Jacobs Board is a
"useless and futile" action, and therefore, excused for several reasons.7
Feb. 4, 2011) [hereinafterjacobs Engineering Complaint].
62 Id.
6 Id. 12.
64 Id. 139.
65 Id. 1 41.
6 JACOBS ENGINEERING GROUP, INC., 2011 PROXYSTATEMENT 29 (2011).
67 Jacobs Engineering Complaint, supra note 61, at t 41.
68 JACOBS ENGINEERING GROUP, INC., 2011 PROXY STATEMENT 11 (2011).
69 JACOBS ENGINEERING GROUP INC., CURRENT REPORT (FORM 8-K) (Jan. 28, 2011) (The
vote was 40,671,646 for and 48,754,130 against the company's executive compensation package with
1,311,298 abstaining).
70 Jacobs Engineering Complaint, supra note 61, at 52.
71 Id. at 156.
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The plaintiffs claim that a pre-suit demand is unnecessary because the
Jacobs Board recommended to shareholders to approve the 2010 executive
compensation package and also failed to take any action once the
recommendation was rejected; therefore, the plaintiffs allege that the
Jacobs Board has demonstrated hostility to the derivative action and
demand would be a useless and futile act.7 2 The plaintiffs also claim that
demand is excused in regard to director Craig L. Martin, because he serves
as President and CEO of Jacobs Engineering; therefore, he received the
unwarranted executive compensation and lacks independence.
The Complaint lists five causes of action. The first cause of action is
for breach of fiduciary duty. The shareholders allege that the defendants
breached their fiduciary duties of loyalty and good faith by failing to
disclose material information and/or made misrepresentations to
shareholders regardingJacobs Engineering's 2010 executive compensation
structure." The second cause of action is against FWC for aiding and
abetting breaches of fiduciary duties. The Complaint alleges that FWC
"substantially assist[ed] the commission of the wrongdoing" perpetrated
by the Jacobs Board." The third cause of action is against FWC for
breach of contract. The Complaint alleges that FWC breached its contract
with Jacobs Engineering by advising the Board to increase executive
compensation for 2010." The fourth cause of action is for corporate
waste. The Complaint alleges that the Board "[gave] away millions of
dollars via a clandestine executive compensation scheme."" The fifth
cause of action is for unjust enrichment. The Complaint alleges that the
senior officers of the company have been unjustly enriched in "the form
of unjustified salaries, benefits, bonuses, [and] stock option grants."7 8
2. Teamsters Local 237 v. McCarthy ("Beazer Homes")
In the Beazer Homes case, a shareholder derivative action was
brought by shareholders on behalf of Beazer Homes USA, Inc. ("Beazer
Homes") against Beazer Homes' Board of Directors ("Beazer Board"),
certain Beazer Homes senior officers, and Beazer Homes' executive
72 Id.
73 Id. at 58-59.
7 Id. at T 63.
7 Id. at172
76 Jacobs Engineering Complaint, supra note 61, at 78.
7 Id. at178.
7 Id. at 1181.
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compensation consultants, PricewaterhouseCoopers LLC ("PwC") and
MarksonHRC, LLC ("Markson")." The Complaint alleges that the
Beazer Board's decision to "increase CEO and top executive pay in 2010,
despite [Beazer Homes'] massive $34 million net loss, w[as] disloyal,
unreasonable, and not the product of a valid exercise of business
judgment."' The Complaint also alleges that the defendants violated
Beazer Homes' "pay-for-performance" policy.' In the Complaint, the
plaintiffs state that in 2010, Beazer Homes' had a total net loss of $34
million dollars, and earnings per share decreased $0.57 dollars per share
(17.23%).' The plaintiffs claim that even though earnings and share
prices fell, executive compensation was increased by almost 8%.'
The plaintiffs discuss how Beazer Homes' executive compensation
practices are rooted in a "pay for performance" policy.' In the 2011 Proxy
Statement, the Beazer Board represented that "Our core compensation
objective continues to be that we will pay for performance - we believe we
should pay higher compensation when our management team achieves
the predetermined goals and lower compensation when it does not."85
The Proxy Statement also states that Beazer Homes' "compensation
programs are premised on the achievement of [] financial [] goals [] that
the Compensation Committee and the Board of Directors believe are
critical to enhancing stockholder value."' The Beazer Board advised
shareholders to approve the executive compensation package for 2010.8
In January 2011, a majority of shareholders rejected Beazer Homes'
executive compensation package for 2010."
The plaintiffs allege that a pre-suit demand upon the Beazer Board is
a "useless and futile action." The plaintiffs argue that the demand
requirement is excused, because the Beazer Board is interested in the
outcome of the litigation and also because they recommended that the
7 Complaint, Teamsters Local 237 v. McCarthy, 2011 CV 197841 (Ga. Super. Ct, Fulton Cty, filed
Mar. 15,2011) [hereinafter Beazer Homes Complaint].
8 Id. at T 3.
81 Id.
8 Id. at 2.
83 Id.
8 Id. at V 27.
85 BEAZER HOMES USA, INC., 2011 PROXYSTATEMENT 31 (2010).
86 Id.
8 Id. at 16-17.
8 BEAmZR HOMEs USA, INc., CURRENT REPORT (FORM 8-K) (Feb. 2, 2011) (The vote vas
20,172,993 for and 23,632,597 against the company's executive compensation package with 142,674
abstaining).
8 Beazer Homes Complaint, supra note 79, at $ 42.
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Beazer Homes' shareholders approve the 2010 executive compensation
package."o
The Complaint lists four causes of action. The first cause of action is
for breach of fiduciary duty. The shareholders allege that the defendants
breached their fiduciary duty of loyalty by approving the 2010 executive
compensation package and by omitting material facts from the
shareholders regarding the 2010 executive compensation package.9 1 The
second cause of action is against PwC and Markson for aiding and
abetting breaches of fiduciary duties. The third cause of action is against
PwC and Markson for breach of contract. The Complaint alleges that
PwC and Markson breached their contracts with Beazer Homes by
advising the Beazer Board to increase executive compensation for 2010.'
The fourth cause of action is for unjust enrichment. The Complaint
alleges that the senior officers of the company have been unjustly
enriched because "[t]he 2010 pay hikes for Beazer's CEO and top
executives ... were unwarranted in light of Beazer's dismal 2010 financial
performance."93
3. Plumbers Local No. 237 v. Davis ("Umpqua Holdings")
In the Umpqua Holdings case, a shareholder derivative action was
brought by shareholders on behalf of Umpqua Holding Corp. ("Umpqua
Holdings") against Umpqua Holdings' Board of Directors ("Umpqua
Board"), certain Umpqua Holdings senior officers, and Umpqua
Holdings' executive compensation consultants, PwC.94 The Complaint
alleges that the Umpqua Board's decision to "increase [executive
compensation] in 2010, despite [Umpqua Holdings'] severely impaired
financial results, were disloyal, irrational and unreasonable.""
In the Complaint, the plaintiffs state that in 2010, Umpqua Holdings'
annual shareholder return declined to negative 7.7%." The plaintiffs
claim that even though annual shareholder return declined, executive
compensation was increased, on average, 118.8%.' The plaintiffs discuss
9 Id. at 1 44.
91 Id. at 1 48.
9 Id. at 156.
9 Id. at V 59.
9 Complaint, Plumbers Local No. 237 v. Davis, 11-cv-633 (D. Ore., filed May 25, 2011)
[hereinafter Umpqua Holdings Complain].
95 Id. at 3.
% Id. at V 33.
9 Id. at 36.
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how Umpqua Holding's executive compensation practices are rooted in a
"pay for performance" policy." In the 2011 Proxy Statement, the
Umpqua Board represented that "Umpqua's executive compensation is
designed to recognize superior operating performance ... Our executive
compensation philosophy is simple: we pay competitive base salaries and
we strongly reward performance."" The Proxy Statement also states that
Umpqua Holdings "Strongly link[s] the interests of executives to the
value derived by our shareholders from owning Company stock."" The
Umpqua Board advised shareholders to approve the executive
compensation package for 2010.101 In April 2011, a majority of
shareholders rejected Umpqua Holdings' executive compensation package
for 2010.1o2
The plaintiffs allege that a pre-suit demand upon the Umpqua Board
is a "useless and futile action."103 The plaintiffs argue that the demand
requirement is excused, because the Umpqua Board was "interested" in
the outcome of the action and by recommending that shareholders
approve the 2010 executive compensation, the Umpqua Board
demonstrated its hostility towards the derivative action.
The Complaint lists four causes of action. The first cause of action is
for breach of fiduciary duty. The shareholders allege that the defendants
breached their fiduciary duty of loyalty by approving the 2010 executive
compensation package and by omitting material facts from the
shareholders regarding the 2010 executive compensation package.0 s The
second cause of action is against PwC for aiding and abetting breaches of
fiduciary duties. The third cause of action is against PwC for breach of
contract. The Complaint alleges that PwC breached their contracts with
Umpqua Holdings by advising the Umpqua Board to increase executive
compensation for 2010.106 The fourth cause of action is for unjust
enrichment. The Complaint alleges that the senior officers of the
company have been unjustly enriched because "[t]he 2010 pay hikes for
9 Id. at 132.
9 UMPQUA HOLDINGS CORP., 2011 PROXYSTATEMENT 30 (2011).
100 Id.
1o1 Id. at 9.
102 UMPQUA HOLDINGS CORP., CURRENT REPORT (FORM 8-K) (April 2Z 2011) (The vote was
30,882,445 for and 54,521,278 against the company's executive compensation package with 2,747,800
abstaining).
103 Umpqua Holdings Complaint, supra note 94, at 1151.
104 Id. at 153.
105 Id. at 57-60.
106 Id. at 66-67.
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Umpqua's CEO and top executives violated Umpqua's pay-for-
performance policy, and were unwarranted in light of Umpqua's dismal
2010 financial performance."o 7
4. Matthews v. Rynd ("Hercules Offshore")
In the Hercules Offshore case, a shareholder derivative action was
brought by shareholders on behalf of Hercules Offshore, Inc. ("Hercules
Offshore") against Hercules Offshore's Board of Directors ("Hercules
Board"), certain Hercules Offshore senior officers, and Hercules
Offshore's executive compensation consultant, FWC.'0o The Complaint
alleges that the Hercules Board's decision to "increase [executive
compensation] in 2010, despite [Hercules Offshore's] severely impaired
financial results, was disloyal, irrational and unreasonable." 0 9
In the Complaint, the plaintiffs state that in 2010, Hercules Offshore
suffered a net operating loss of $145,160,000 dollars and saw annual
shareholder return decline 27.2%."o The plaintiffs claim that even though
the company suffered a net operating loss and annual shareholder return
declined, executive compensation was increased, on average 122.9%. "
The plaintiffs discuss how Hercules Offshore's executive compensation
practices are historically rooted in a "pay for performance" policy.112 In
the 2011 Proxy Statement, the Hercules Board represented that the
executive compensation program is designed "to attract, retain, motivate,
and reward executive officers who are capable of leading [Hercules
Offshore] in a complex, competitive, and changing industry.""' The
Proxy Statement also states that the Hercules Board has a policy to "pay
for performance."" 4 The Hercules Board advised shareholders to approve
the executive compensation package for 2010."' In May 2011, a majority
of shareholders rejected Hercules Offshore's executive compensation
package for 2010."1
107 Id. at t 69.
108 Complaint, Matthews v. Rynd, 2011-34508 (Tex. Dist. Ct., Harris Cty., filed June 8, 2011)
[hereinafter Herules Ofhore Complaint].
109 Id. at 14.
110 Id. at 3.
III Id. att38.
112 Id. at t 34.
us HERcuLES OFFSHORE CORP., 2011 PROXYSTATEMENT 20 (2011).
114 Id.
115 Id. at 43.
116 HERcULES OFFSHORE CORP., CURRENT REPORT (FORM 8-K) (May 10, 2011) (The vote was
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The plaintiffs allege that a pre-suit demand upon the Hercules Board
is a "useless and futile action.""' The plaintiffs argue that the demand
requirement is excused, because the Hercules Board was "interested" in
the outcome of the action and that by recommending that shareholders
approve the 2010 executive compensation, the Hercules Board
demonstrated its hostility towards the derivative action."' The plaintiffs
also argue that the Hercules Board is not entitled to business judgment
protection.
The Complaint lists four causes of action. The first cause of action is
for breach of fiduciary duty. The shareholders allege that the defendants
breached their fiduciary duty of loyalty by approving the 2010 executive
compensation package and by violating the company's own "pay for
performance" policy regarding executive compensation.12 0 The second
cause of action is against FWC for aiding and abetting breaches of
fiduciary duties. The third cause of action is against FWC for breach of
contract. The Complaint alleges that FWC breached its contracts with
Hercules Offshore by advising the Hercules Board to increase executive
compensation for 2010.121 The fourth cause of action is for unjust
enrichment. The Complaint alleges that the senior officers of the
company have been unjustly enriched because "[t]he 2010 pay hikes for
Hercules Offshore's CEO and top executives violated Hercules
Offshore's pay-for-performance policy, and were unwarranted in light of
Hercules Offshore's dismal 2010 financial performance."22
5. Swanson v. Weil ('Janus Capital")
In the Janus Capital case, a shareholder derivative action was brought
by shareholders on behalf of Janus Capital Group, Inc. ("Janus Capital")
against Janus Capital's Board of Directors (Janus Board) and certain Janus
Capital senior officers." The Complaint seeks relief for "Janus Board's
disloyalty, its CEO and top executives' unjust enrichment, and its
24,896,201 for and 35,870,743 aginst the company's executive compensation package with 4,001,626
abstaining).
117 Hercules Offshore Complaint, supra note 108, at V150.
us Id.
119 Id. at t 51.
120 Id. at$ 55-59.
121 Id. at 164.
122 Id. at 1 67.
' Complaint, Swanson v. Weil, et al., (No. 11-cv-02142) (D. Col., filed Aug. 16, 2011),
available at http//www.pacer.gov/cgi-binAinks.pl [hereinafterjanus Capital Complaint].
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compensation consultant's aiding and abetting breaches of fiduciary duty
and breach of contract."'24 The Complaint also alleges "the false and
misleading Proxy Statement [] tainted the stockholder vote for the
directors in violation of Section 14 of the Exchange Act."'
In the Complaint, the plaintiffs state that in 2010 Janus Capital stock
price suffered a 4.7% decrease.126 The plaintiffs claim that even though
the company suffered a decrease in stock price, executive compensation
was increased.'27 The plaintiffs also cite to a New York Times article that
criticized Janus Capital's executive compensation policies.'28 The
plaintiffs discuss howJanus Capital's executive compensation practices are
historically rooted in a "pay for performance" policy.'29 In the 2011 Proxy
Statement, the Janus Board represented that "we design our executive
officer compensation programs to provide variable compensation
opportunities to our key executives that reflect both Company
performance and individual executive performance, along with the
alignment of that compensation with the interests of public and fund
shareholders."' The Janus Board advised shareholders to approve the
executive compensation package for 2010.'' In May 2011, a majority of
shareholders rejected Janus Capital's executive compensation package for
2010. 132
The plaintiffs allege that a pre-suit demand upon the Janus Board is a
"useless and futile action."' The plaintiffs argue that the demand
requirement is excused, because the Janus Board was "interested" in the
outcome of the action and that the Janus Board made false and misleading
statements in Janus Capital's 2011 Proxy Statement relating to the
company's "pay-for-performance" policy.'3 4 The plaintiffs also argue that
the Janus Board is not entitled to business judgment protection.135
124 Id. at 114.
125 Id.
126 Id.at138.
127 Id. at 144.
128 See Gretchen Morgenson, Paydurks as Bi As Tajikistan, N.Y. TIMES, (June 18, 2011),
httpV/www.nytimes.corn2011/D6/19/business/19grethtml?_r= 1.
129 SeeJANus CAPYTAL GROUP INC., 2011 PROxYSTATEMENT 71 (2011).
130 Id.
131 Id. at73.
132 JANUS CAPrAL GROUP INC., CURRENT REPORT (FORM 8-K) (April 29,2011) (The vote was
59,890,647 for and 82,667,210 against the company's executive compensation package with 6,718,257
abstaining).
133 Janus Capital Complaint, supra note 123, at 64.
134 Id. at 1167.
135 Id. at 11 68.
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The Complaint lists three causes of action. The first cause of action is
for violation of Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act. The shareholders
allege that the defendants made false and misleading statements
concerning the company's policy regarding "pay for performance"
executive compensation.' The second cause of action is for breach of
fiduciary duty. The shareholders allege that the defendants breached their
fiduciary duty of loyalty by approving the 2010 executive compensation
package and by violating the company's own policy regarding "pay for
performance" executive compensation. The third cause of action is for
unjust enrichment. The Complaint alleges that the senior officers of the
company have been unjustly enriched because "payments to Janus' CEO
and top executives violated Janus' pay-for-performance policy, and were
unwarranted and undeserved in light of Janus' dismal 2010 financial
performance."'
6. NECA-IBEW Pension Fund v. Cox ("Cincinnati Bell")
In the Cincinnati Bell case, a shareholder derivative action was
brought by shareholders on behalf of Cincinnati Bell, Inc. ("Cincinnati
Bell") against Cincinnati Bell's Board of Directors ("Cincinnati Board")
certain Cincinnati Bell senior officers, and Cincinnati Bell's executive
compensation consultant, Towers Watson & Co. ("TWC").3 " The
Complaint alleges the "Board's decisions to increase CEO and top
executive pay in 2010, despite the Company's severely impaired financial
results, were disloyal, irrational and unreasonable, and not the product of
a valid exercise of business judgment."'39
In the Complaint, the plaintiffs state that in 2010, Cincinnati Bell
suffered a $61.3 million dollar decline in net income and negative 18.8%
annual shareholder return."4 The plaintiffs claim that even though the
company suffered a decrease in net income, executive compensation was
increased.14 ' The plaintiffs discuss how Cincinnati Bell's executive
compensation practices are historically rooted in a "pay for performance"
policy.142 In the 2011 Proxy Statement, the Cincinnati Board represented
136 Id. at$ 71.
137 Id. at 79.
138 Complaint, NECA-IBEW Pension Fund v. Cox, et al., 11-cv-451 (S.D. Ohio, filed July 5,2011)
[hereinafter Cincinnati Bell Complaint].
13 Id. at 13.
14o Id. at V 2.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 27.
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that "a significant portion of the total compensation for each of our
executives is directly related to the Company's earnings and revenues and
other performance factors" and "incentive compensation [is] based upon
the achievement of company performance and individual performance
goals."143 The Cincinnati Board advised shareholders to approve the
executive compensation package for 2010.'" In May 2011, a majority of
shareholders rejected Cincinnati Bell's executive compensation package
for 2010.145
The plaintiffs allege that a pre-suit demand upon the Cincinnati
Board is a "useless and futile action."" The plaintiffs argue that the
demand requirement is excused, because the defendants face a
"substantial likelihood of liability for beach of loyalty."'47 The plaintiffs
also argue that the Cincinnati Board is not entitled to business judgment
protection.'48
The Complaint lists three causes of action. The first cause of action is
for breach of fiduciary duty. The shareholders allege that the defendants
breached their fiduciary duty of loyalty by approving the 2010 executive
compensation package and by violating the company's own policy
regarding "pay for performance" executive compensation. The second
cause of action is against TWC for aiding and abetting breaches of
fiduciary duties. The Complaint alleges that TWC "rendered substantial
assistance" of the Cincinnati Board's breach of fiduciary duty.'49 The
third cause of action is for unjust enrichment. The Complaint alleges that
the senior officers of the company have been unjustly enriched because
the pay hikes received by the senior officers violated Cincinnati Bell's
"pay-for-performance" policy. 50
7. Haberland v. Bulkeley ("Dex One")
In the Dex One case, a shareholder derivative action was brought by
shareholders on behalf of Dex One Corp. ("Dex One") against Dex One's
143 CINCINNATI BEILINC., 2011 PROXYSTATEMENT20-22 (2011).
'" Id. at 20.
145 CINCINNATI BELL INC., CURRENT REPORT (FORM 8-K) (May 3, 2011) (The vote was
49,319,653 for and %,939,788 against the company's executive compensation package with 19,367,702
abstaiing).
146 Cincinnati Bell Complaint, supra note 138, at t 42.
147 Id. at V 42.
148 Id.
149 Id. at V 53.
150 Id. at 1156.
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Board of Directors ("Dex One Board") and certain Dex One senior
officers."' The Complaint alleges the directors "breached their fiduciary
duties by materially increasing 2010 compensation in the immediate wake
of (a) the Company's bankruptcy ... [and] (b) the plummet of the
Company's stock price."152
In the Complaint, the plaintiffs state that from February to December
2010, Dex One's stock price decreased from $33.56 per share to $7.46 per
share, a 78% decrease."' The Complaint also alleges that Dex One was in
bankruptcy from May 2009 to February 2010 and had a thirteen month
suspension of public trading of its stock on the New York Stock Exchange
("NYSE").154 The plaintiffs claim that even though the company suffered
through bankruptcy and a dramatic decrease in their stock price, executive
compensation was increased almost 300%."' The plaintiffs discuss how
Dex One's executive compensation practices are historically rooted in a
"pay for performance" policy."' In the 2011 Proxy Statement, the Dex
One Board represented that Dex One "align[s] executive pay with
performance, both annual and long-term" and "strongly link[s] the
interests of executives to those of the Company's shareholders."" The
Dex One Board advised shareholders to approve the executive
compensation package for 2011.' In May 2011, a majority of
shareholders rejected Dex One's executive compensation package for
2011.159
The plaintiffs allege that a pre-suit demand upon the Dex One Board
is excused, because there is doubt that the Dex One Board's decision to
increase 2010 executive compensation was a protected business
judgment." The plaintiffs also argue that the Dex One Board is
interested in the litigation "because there is substantial likelihood that they
will be liable for their conduct.""'
1s' Complaint, Haberland v. Bulkeley, 5:llcv-00463-D (E.D.N.C, filed Sept. 1, 2011) [hereinafter
Dex One Complaint].
152 Id. at 13.
153 Id. at 47.
154 Id. at 149.
155 Id.
156 Id. at$ 51.
157 DExONE CORP., 2011 PROXY STATEMENT 13 (2011).
158 Id. at 35.
159 DEX ONE CORP., CURRENT REPORT (FORM 8-K) (May 3, 2011) (The vote was 17,962,834 for
and 19,467,333 against the company's executive compensation package with 11,705 abstaining).
16o DexOne Complaint, supra note 151, atT74.
161 Id. at$75.
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The Complaint lists four causes of action. The first cause of action is
for breach of fiduciary duty. The shareholders allege that the defendants
breached their fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, good faith, and candor for
the issuance false and misleading statements."2 The second cause of
action is also for breach of fiduciary duty. The shareholders allege that the
defendants breached their fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, good faith, and
candor by approving the 2010 executive compensation package and by
violating the company's own policy regarding "pay for performance"
executive compensation. 3 The third cause of action is also for breach of
fiduciary duty. The shareholders allege that the defendants breached their
fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, good faith, and candor by failing to
respond to the negative "say on pay" vote.1" The fourth cause of action is
for unjust enrichment. The Complaint alleges that the senior officers of
the company have been unjustly enriched because the pay hikes received
by the senior officers violated Dex One's "pay for performance" policy.165
C. What We Have Learned
It is instructive to look at the derivative lawsuits filed so far
concerning "say on pay" votes on executive compensation under the
Dodd-Frank Act. By examining the cases, there are five areas of concern
for all companies that are subject to the provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act.
First, companies must be aware that even though the "say on pay" votes
on executive compensation are explicitly advisory and do not add or
modify any exsiting fiduciary duties of a company or its board of directors,
shareholders are still filing derivative lawsuits on behalf of the company.
Second, all the companies involved in the derivative lawsuits are alleged to
have a publicly acknowledged "pay for performance" executive
compensation structure. Third, the plaintiffs argue that demand is futile
because the directors for the companies are "interested" in the litigation
and face a substantial likelihood that they will be liable for their conduct
and also argue that the negative "say on pay" votes are evidence that the
executive compensation packages are not in the shareholders' best
interests and, therefore, rebut the "business judgment rule" presumption.
Fourth, companies need to be aware that institutional shareholders are
casting most of the "say on pay" votes on executive compensation. Fifth,
162 Id. at 1 87-91.
163 Id. at 92-98.
165 Id. at199-105.
165 Id. at $ 1064)9.
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executive compensation consultants are being included as defendants
under a theory of "aiding and abetting" the directors in breaching their
fiduciary duties.
1. Shareholders Bringing Claims Despite "Say on Pay" Votes Being
Advisory
Companies should be aware that shareholders are bringing derivative
claims based on negative "say on pay" votes on executive compensation,
even though the votes are specifically advisory. The Dodd-Frank Act
makes clear that the "say on pay" votes are merely advisory and are not
binding on a company or its board of directors." The "say on pay" vote
may also not be construed as overruling a decision by a company's board
of directors. It cannot change or add to the fiduciary duties of a
company's board of directors and it may not restrict or limit the ability of
shareholders to make proposals for inclusion in proxy materials related to
executive compensation."7 The Dodd-Frank Act does not provide for any
specific remedy for shareholders if a company declines to change its
executive compensation structure following a negative "say on pay" vote
by shareholders.
It is instructive to look at the percentage of companies that received
negative "say on pay" votes in 2011. As of June 2011, 2293 of the Russell
30001" companies had held "say on pay" votes." Shareholders returned
negative "say on pay" votes at only 45, or 1.9%, of these companies.'70
Out of these 45 negative "say on pay" votes, 7 have resulted in shareholder
derivative lawsuits.17' This number reflects that about 15% of the
" 15 U.S.CA S 78n-1(c) (West 2012).
167 Id.
168 The Russell 3000 Index measures the performance of the largest 3000 U.S. companies
representing approximately 98% of the investable U.S. equity market. It includes companies such as: Exxon
Mobil, Apple, Chevron, AT&T, GE, and Microsoft. See RussELL 3000 INDEX,
httpV/www.russell.com/Indexer/data/factsheets/us/Russell_3000 Index.asp (last visited Dec. 20, 2011).
169 See James D. C. Barrall & Alice M. Chung, Say on Pay and Related Advisory Vote Proposals,
IATHAM&WATKINS, (Sept 12, 2011), httpV/www.lw.com/Resources.aspx?page=FirmPublicationDetail
&publication=4337. It is important to note that in 2010, over 600 companies held "say on pay" votes and only
3 (0.5%) companies failed to obtain shareholder approval. See Institutional Shareholder Services, 2010 U.S.
Postseason Report, ISS, available at httpV/www.issgovernance.con/files/private/ISSUSPostSeasonReport.pdE
170 See Equilar Report, supra note 41.
171 See BradleyJ. Andreozzi, Update on Lawsuits in de Wake ofSay-On-Pay, DRIuNKERBIDDLE (Oct. 13,
2011), httpVww.mondaq.co/unitedstateW148946/Securities/Update+On+Lawsuits+In+The+Wake+
Of+SayOnPay.
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companies that received a negative "say on pay" vote are facing
shareholder derivative lawsuits.
The percentage of negative votes has also not affected whether the
shareholders bring a claim based on a negative "say on pay" vote on
executive compensation. In the Jacobs Engineering case, 55% of the
shareholders voted against the executive compensation plan. 2 In the
Beazer Homes case, 54% of the shareholders voted against the executive
compensation plan." In the Umpqua Holdings case, 64% of the
shareholders voted against the executive compensation plan. 4 In the
Hercules Offshore case, 59% of the shareholders voted against the
executive compensation plan."' In the Cincinnati Bell case, 70% of the
shareholders voted against the executive compensation plan.'1 6  In the
Janus Capital case, 60% of the shareholders voted against the executive
compensation plan."' In the Dex One case, 52% of the shareholders
voted against the executive compensation plan."' These cases show that
as long as a majority of the shareholders vote against the executive
compensation plan, a derivative suit is being filed. To date, there has not
been a shareholder derivative suit filed against a company and its board of
directors following a positive "say on pay" vote on executive
compensation.
2. Companies' "Payfor Performance" Executive Compensation Structures
Shareholders consider pay for performance an integral aspect of
executive compensation. 9 According to a 2011 ISS survey "94 percent of
institutional investor respondents believed that pay-for-performance plays
either a 'critical' or 'important' role in evaluating executive
compensation.""so Experts have also emphasized "pay for performance" as
the optimal form of compensation.8 '
172 Institutional Shareholder Services, 2011 U.S. Postseaon Report, 20, available at
http/v/www.issgovernance.cornffiles/private2011_USPostSeasonReport_0929.pdf [hereinafter 2011 ISS
Report].
173 Id.
174 Id. at 21.
1s Id. at 20-21.
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 Barrall & Chung, supra note 169.
179 2011 ISS Report, supra note 172, at 10.
180 Id.
181 Simone Sepe, Making Sense ofEwutive Compensation, 36 DELJ. CORP. L 189,204 (2011).
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All of the derivative claims discussed in this article include a claim that
a company violated its "pay for performance" policy. Specifically, the
plaintiffs assert a disconnect between pay and performance by looking at
weakening corporate financial performance and increasing executive
compensation." Plaintiffs in these cases have also relied on ISS
recommendations concerning "say on pay" voting." During the 2011
Proxy Season, of the 340 recommendations by ISS to vote negatively on
the proposed executive compensation, 177, or about 52%, of the negative
ISS recommendations were based upon a company's "pay for
performance" misalignment.
As discussed above, all the companies have some type of "pay for
performance" executive compensation structure. In Jacobs Engineering's
2011 Proxy Statement, the Jacobs Board represented that Jacobs
Engineering's "executive compensation program has been designed to
promote a performance-based culture and align the interests of executives
with those of shareholders by linking a substantial portion of
compensation to the Company's performance."'" In Beazer Homes' 2011
Proxy Statement, the Beazer Board represented that their "core
compensation objective continues to be that we will pay for
performance. In Umpqua Holdings' 2011 Proxy Statement, the
Umpqua Board represented that their "executive compensation is
designed to recognize superior operating performance ... Our executive
compensation philosophy is simple: we pay competitive base salaries and
we strongly reward performance."" In Hercules Offshore's 2011 Proxy
Statement, the Hercules Board represented that their "compensation
committee will continue to design compensation arrangements with the
objectives of emphasizing pay for performance."M8 8
In Janus Capital's 2011 Proxy Statement, the Janus Board represented
that their executive compensation program was designed to "attract,
motivate and retain highly qualified executives ... reward strong
182 Kyoto Takahasi Lin & Gillian Emmett Moldowan, Perceived Pay-for-Performance Disconnect
Brings Say-on-Pay Shareholder Derivative Suits, DAVIS POLK BRIEFING: GOVERNANCE (June 24, 2011,
12:29 PM), http://www.davispolk.com/briefing/corporategovernance/blog.aspx?entry= 69.
183 See e.g. UMPQUA HOLDINGS CORP., CURRENT REPORT, (FORM 8-K) (April 22, 2011) ("The ISS
report found a 'disconnect' between out CEO compensation in 2010 and the company's total shareholder
return.").
184 2011 ISS Report, supra note 172, at 5.
185 JACOBS ENGINEERING GROUP, INC., 2011 PRoxYSTATEMENT 10 (2011).
186 BEAZER HOMES, USA, INC., 2011 PROXY STATEMENT 31 (2011).
187 UMPQUA HOLDINGS CORP., 2011 PROXYSTATEMENT 30 (2011).
188 HERCULES OFFSHORE, INC., 2011 PROXYSTATEMENT 43 (2011).
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performance ... [and] promote a performance-based culture with
individual compensation levels varying significantly from year to year
based on changes in business and individual performance."18 9 In
Cincinnati Bell's 2011 Proxy Statement, the Cincinnati Board represented
that their executive compensation program is "based upon the
achievement of company performance and individual performance goals"
and is "tied to the achievement of short-term and long-term performance
objectives, principally the Company's earnings."" In Dex One's 2011
Proxy Statement, the Dex One Board represented that their executive
compensation program "align[s] executive pay with performance, both
annual and long-term" and "strongly link[s] the interests of executives to
those of the Company's shareholders.""'
Companies must be aware that shareholders may use language in their
policies, which link executive compensation to company performance,
against a company and its board of directors in a derivative claim. Later in
this article, I provide advice to companies to minimize any potential
exposure arising from language concerning executive compensation
included in their Proxy Statement or any other public filings. 92
3. Business Judgment Rule and Director Independence
Demand is excused in situations where a complaint raises "a
reasonable doubt as to (i) director disinterest or independence or (ii)
whether the directors exercised proper business judgment in approving
the challenged transaction." 93
Courts have stated that one way to excuse a failure to make a demand
on the board of directors is for plaintiffs to plead with particularity facts
creating a reasonable doubt that the directors are disinterested and
independent. 94 The plaintiffs state that the directors face a substantial
likelihood of liability and are interested in the outcome of the litigation
because the directors of each company approved the executive
189 JANUS CAPrTALGROUP, INC., 2011 PROXYSTATEMENT33 (2011).
190 CINCINNATI BELLINC., 2011 PROXYSTATEMENT20-22, 32 (2011).
191 DExONE CORP., 2011 PROXYSTATEMENT 13 (2011).
192 See infra Section IV(A).
' RCM Sec. Fund, Inc. v. Stanton, 928 F.2d 1318, 1330 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing Grobow v.
Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 188-89 (Del. 1988)).
194 Jay M. Zitter, Circumstances Excusing Demand Upon Board of Directors that is Otherwise
Prerequisite to Bringing of Stockholder's Derivative Suit on Behalf of Corporation, 42 A.L.R. 6th 1 passim
(2009).
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compensation structure being challenged and then recommended
shareholder approval of the executive compensation structure.195
Generally, to show that directors are "interested," the plaintiffs must
show that divided loyalties are present or that a director has received or is
entitled to receive a personal financial benefit from the challenged
transaction." A lack of candor in describing the CEO's compensation
may also render the directors "interested" for purposes of excusing
demand.'97 Shareholders must allege that directors could not impartially
and independently consider a demand.' The plaintiffs are using the fact
that the directors not only approved the executive compensation structure
being challenged, they also recommended that the shareholders approve
it. They argue that the directors would not proceed with an action that
would invalidate a decision that they approved. The plaintiffs in Beazer
Homes, Hercules Offshore, Umpqua Holdings, Cincinnati Bell, Jacobs
Engineering, and Dex One also allege that because a director also served
as an executive officer of the company and would receive a direct benefit
of the challenged executive compensation structure, they could not be
"independent."'"
Demand is also excused in situations where the complaint raises "a
reasonable doubt as to ... whether the directors exercised proper business
judgment in approving the challenged transaction."2 A board of
directors is protected by the "business judgment rule" and courts "will not
inquire into the wisdom of actions taken by a director in the absence of
fraud, bad faith, or abuse of discretion." 20 1 " [T]he presumption can be
overcome by proof that the director breached his fiduciary duty to the
corporation-his duty of loyalty and his duty to exercise due care in its
performance."2 0' The plaintiffs state that the negative "say on pay" votes
' See supra Section 11(B).
196 See Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 624 (Del. 1984); see also Litt v. Wycoff, No. Civ. A 19803-NC,
2003 WL 1794724, at *3 (Del. Ch. Mar. 28,2003).
19 In re infoUSA, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, 953 A.2d 963,990-91 (DeL C. 2007).
' See, e.g., Beam ex rd. Martha Stewart Living Onnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart; 845 A2d 1040, 1046 n.8
(Del. 2004).
199 See supra Section I1(B).
2 RCM Sec. Fund, Inc. v. Stanton, 928 F.2d 1318, 1330 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing Grobow v.
Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 188-89 (Del. 1988)).
201 Radol v. Thomas, 772 F.2d 244, 256 (6th Cir. 1987); see also Gearhart Indus. v. Smith Int'l,
741 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1984 ); In re Abbott Labs. Derivative S'Holders Litig., 325 F.3d 795 (7th Cir.
2003); Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986).
2W CDX Liquidating Trust v. Venrock Assocs., 640 F.3d 209, 215 (7th Cir. 2011); see also
Mukamal v. Bakes, 378 Fed. Appx. 890, (11th Cir. 2010); Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882
(6th Cir. 1986).
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were evidence that the executive compensation packages were not the
shareholders' best interests and, therefore, rebutted the "business
judgment rule" presumption.
For example, in the Cincinnati Bell Complaint, the plaintiffs
contended that the negative "say on pay" vote was evidence that the
executive compensation package was not in the shareholders best interests
and, therefore, the decision to increase executive compensation was not
entitled to "business judgment rule" protection.203 Likewise, in the Janus
Capital Complaint, the plaintiffs contend that the negative "say on pay"
vote was evidence that rebutted the "business judgment rule"
presumption.2 0 All of the other Complaints include similar language,
discussing how the negative "say on pay" vote was evidence that rebutted
the "business judgment rule" presumption.
Plaintiffs in the Cincinnati Bell and Umpqua Holdings cases also
argued that they were using their "independent business judgment" when
voting on an executive compensation structure. In Cincinnati Bell, the
plaintiffs state that their "shareholder base consists primarily of
sophisticated institutional investors ... [and] these types of sophisticated
shareholders possess the experience, expertise and resources to assess ...
whether executive compensation is in their best interests as shareholder
owners."205 In Umpqua Holdings, the plaintiffs state that "by voting
against the Umpqua Board's 'say-on-pay' resolution, Umpqua
shareholders ... concluded, in their independent business judgment, that
the 2010 pay hikes approved by the Umpqua Board ... were not in the
best interest of Umpqua and/or its shareholders."206
Based upon the facts listed above, many questions remain
unanswered. If shareholders return a negative "say on pay" vote in a case
where ISS made a positive recommendation, can the company still argue
that they are using their independent business judgment? In the opposite
case, could a shareholder bring a derivative claim if the shareholders
return a positive "say on pay" vote, but the ISS made a negative
recommendation? Neither of these cases has arisen yet, but with "say on
pay" votes in their infancy, it would not be unexpected in the coming
years.
2 Cincinnati Bell Complaint, supra note 138, at l42.
W4 Janus Capital Complaint, supra note 123, at 13.
2os Cincinnati Bell Complaint, supra note 138, at 134.
2% Umpqua Holdings Complaint, supra note 94, at i142.
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4. Institutional Shareholders
Most of the "say on pay" votes on executive compensation are being
cast by institutional shareholders.207  Approximately 73% of the publicly
traded equity value in U.S. public corporations is held by institutional
shareholders.2 08 During the last twenty years, institutional investors have
steadily expanded their presence in the largest U.S. corporations, despite
the significant effect of the economic recession on their equity
portfolio.20
Institutional investors, while alleging decisions based on their own
"independent business judgment," usually receive advice from
shareholder advocates. The largest of these advocates is ISS.210 ISS is a
provider of proxy advisory and corporate governance solutions to financial
market participants.' In 2011, ISS issued recommendations on 3,009
"say on pay" proposals.2 12 Out of those 3,009 recommendations, ISS only
recommended voting against the "say on pay" proposal for 340, or about
11%, of those companies.213 ISS recommended negative "say on pay"
votes "due to pay-for-performance misalignment ... [and] problematic
pay practices." 21 Out of the 340 negative ISS recommendations,
shareholders returned negative "say on pay" votes at 38, or 10%, of those
companies.215 It 1S important to note that ISS recommended voting
against "say on pay" proposals for all the companies that have filed
derivative claims.2 16
Generally, institutional shareholders do not owe any duties to one
another or the corporations in which they own shares. 217  Institutional
M Joseph E. Bachelder, III, Say-on-Pay Under Dodd-Frank, THE HARVARD IAW SCHOOL FORUM
ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REGUIATION (Sept. 17,2011).
208 Matteo Tonello and Stephan Robimov, The 2010 Institutional Investment Report. Trends in Asset
Allocation and Portfolio Composition, 27, available at http//www.conference-board.orgfpublicatons/
publicationdetail.cfin?publicationid=1872. Mutual funds make up the largest group of institutional
shareholders based upon the value oftheir holdings. See Bachelder, supra note 207.
W Tonello and Robimov, supra note 208, at 27.
210 See ISS, httpl/www.issgovernance.con/. "ISS' services include objective governance research and
analysis, end-to-end proxy voting and distribution solutions, turnkey securities class-action claims
management, and reliable governance data and modeling tools." Id.
211 Seek).
212 2011 ISS Report, supra note 172, at 5.
213 Id.
214 Id.
215 Id.
216 See id.
217 See Roberta S. Karmel, Should a Duty to the Corporation Be Imposed on Institutional Shareholders? 60
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shareholders are "not investing their own capital, but the capital of others
to whom they owe fiduciary duties. There is a potential and sometimes
an actual conflict between the beneficiaries of an institutional investor and
the shareholders and other constituents of corporations in which they
invest."218  Empirical evidence also shows that institutional investors do
not keep stocks for as long as non-institutional shareholders. 219 However,
"institutions have a duty to invest assets of their beneficiaries prudently
and such prudence may benefit the financial structures and operations of
portfolio companies."20
5. Executive Compensation Consultants are Not Immune from Suit
Companies' reliance on executive compensation consultants is a
common practice.2' However, it was not until recently that
compensation consultations have been named in executive compensation
shareholder derivative suits. Plaintiffs in all but two of the shareholder
derivative suits raised claims for aiding and abetting the board of directors'
alleged breaches of fiduciary duties and for breach of contract.22 It is
important to note that courts have been more wary of executive
compensation consultants not acting in the shareholders' best interests. In
a case from the Southern District of New York, the District Court stated
that executive compensation consultants had "a skewed focus when it
comes to executive compensation ... generally favoring [] larger
compensation practices, while rarely taking into account of limits that a
reasonable shareholder might place on such expenditures."223
The plaintiffs are bringing claims against the executive compensation
consultants under two different theories of liability. The first theory is
that the compensation consultants "aided and abetted" the directors'
breaches of fiduciary duties. In the Jacobs Engineering Complaint, the
plaintiffs state that the Jacobs Board violated the fiduciary duties of
Bus. lAw 1 (Nov. 2004).
218 Id.
219 See Bachelder, supra note 207.
220 Id. (citing Greggv. Transp. Workers ofAm. Int'l, 343 F.3d 833, 840-41 (6th Cir. 2003)).
221 Beth Boland, et al., Say on Pay': Sharolder 'No' Votes Now Lading to Derivedre Acions Challenging
Eveudve Compensaion, BiNGHAM (July 7, 2011), httpi/www.bingham.con/Media.aspx?MedialD= 12582 (last
visited Dec. 20,2011).
M Plaintiffs in the Janus Capital and Dex One cases did not bring claims against the executive
compensation consultants.
M SEC v. Bank of Am. Corp., 09 Civ. 6829, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15460, at *14 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 22, 2010).
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candor, good faith, and loyalty, and that the consultants "acted with
knowledge of the wrongdoing [], substantially assisted the
accomplishment of that wrongdoing and was aware of its overall
contribution to and furtherance of the wrongdoing."2 4 The Hercules
Offshore Complaint, Beazer Homes Complaint, Cincinnati Bell
Complaint, and Umpqua Holdings Complaint all contain similar
language.
The second theory alleged is for breach of contract. In the Jacobs
Engineering Complaint, the plaintiffs state that the executive
compensation consultants assisted the Jacobs Board with setting the level
of executive compensation payments. The plaintiffs assert that "[i]n light
of the Jacobs' dismal financial results, increasing the amounts of
compensation paid, or to be paid to Jacobs executives ... was unreasonable
and not in good faith" and that because of this, the executive
compensation consultants "breached its contract with Jacobs to render
competent and sound advice and service regarding [] executive
compensation."" The Hercules Offshore Complaint, Beazer Homes
Complaint, Cincinnati Bell Complaint, and Umpqua Holdings
Complaint all contain similar language.
Plaintiffs in these cases will face a high hurdle when litigating claims
against the compensation consultants. For an "aiding and abetting" claim
to succeed, the plaintiffs must "allege: (1) the existence of a fiduciary
relationship, (2) that the fiduciary breached its duty, (3) that a defendant,
who is not a fiduciary, knowingly participated in the breach, and (4) that
damages to the plaintiff resulted from the concerted action of the fiduciary
and the non-fiduciary."" This means that a court will not only need to
find that the board of directors breached their fiduciary duties, but also
that the compensation consultants knowingly participated in the breach.
For the breach of contract claims, the courts will look at the specific
language of the contracts to determine if there has been any breach. Many
commentators have opined that the inclusion of executive compensation
consultants as defendants is designed to create more leverage to increase
the settlement value of the shareholder derivative suits.22 7
2 Jacobs Engineering Complaint, supra note 61, 172.
225 Id. 1 75.
226 Mukamal v. Bakes, 378 Fed. Appx. 890, 902 (11th Cir. 2010) (Delaware law); see also Miles
Farm Supply, LLC v. Helena Chem. Co., 595 F.3d 663 (6th Cir. 2010) (Kentucky law); see also CDX
Liquidating Trust v. Venrock Assocs., 640 F.3d 209 (7th Cir. 2011) (Illinois law); see also Sharp Int'l
Corp. v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 403 F.3d 43 (2d Cir. 2005) (New York law); see also Broussard v.
Meineke Disc. Muffler Shops, 155 F.3d 331 (4th Cir. 1998) (North Carolina law).
2V See Boland, supra note 221.
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D. Court Rulings
As of October 2, 2012, there have been rulings in three of the cases
discussed above. In the Cincinnati Bell case, the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of Ohio ("Ohio Court") denied the defendants'
Motion to Dismiss." In the Beazer Homes case, the Fulton County
Superior Court ("Georgia Court") granted the defendants' Motion to
Dismiss.7' Both of these cases will be discussed at length below. In the
Umpqua Holdings case, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Oregon ("Oregon Court") denied the defendants' Motion to Dismiss.2
1. Cincinnati Bell Order
On September 20, 2011, the Ohio Court denied the defendants'
Motion to Dismiss. The defendants' motion was decided under Ohio
law.2 In the Cincinnati Bell Order, the defendants first asked the Ohio
Court to dismiss the suit, claiming that they were protected by the
business judgment rule.2 The Ohio Court held that the plaintiffs
adequately pleaded a claim of breach of fiduciary duty.23
Directors owe the duties of loyalty and care to the corporation.23
"The duty of loyalty requires that directors perform their duties 'in good
faith, in a manner the director reasonably believes to be in or not opposed
to the best interests of the corporation.'"" The Ohio Court went on to
state that informed decisions on compensation by disinterested directors
are presumed to be protected by the business judgment rule" and that
2 Order Denyg Def's Motion to Dismiss, NECA-IBEW Pension Fund v. Cox, 11-cv-451, 2011
WL 4383368 (S.D. Ohio, Sept 20,2011) [hereinafter Cincinnati Bell Order].
m Order Granting Del's Motion to Dismiss, Teamsters Local 237 v. McCarthy, 2011-cv-197841
(Ga. Super. Ct., Sept 16, 2011) [hereinafter Beazer Homes Order].
2 Order Granting Def.'s Motion to Dismiss, Plumbers Local No. 237 v. Davis, 11-cv-633,
2012 WL 104776 (D. Or., Jan. 11, 2012) [hereinafter Umpqua Holdings Order].
231 See Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Serv. Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 98 (1991).
232 Cincinnati Bell Order, supra note 228, at *4.
233 Id.
23' Id. at *2 (citing Radol v. Thomas, 772 F.2d 244, 257 (6th Cir. 1987) (courts "will not
inquire into the wisdom of actions taken by a director in the absence of fraud, bad faith, or abuse of
discretion.")).
235 Id. (quoting Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 5 1701.59(B) (West 2011)). Under Ohio law "directors will
face liability only if it is shown by clear and convincing evidence that their actions were undertaken with 'a
deliberate intent to cause injury to the corporation' or 'reckless disregard for the best interests of the
corporation.'" Id. (quoting Ohio Rev. Code Ann. S 1701.59(D) (West 2011)).
236 Id. (citing Prod. Res. Group LLC v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 779 (Del. Ch. 2004)).
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the plaintiffs bear the burden to present facts that rebut the business
judgment rule's presumption of good faith of directors.
The Ohio Court emphasized that the "'business judgment rule
imposes a burden of proof, not a burden of pleading.'" 8 "When plaintiffs
allege a breach of fiduciary duty, 'the business judgment rule would
impose on [p]laintiffs a burden at trial to present evidence to rebut the
presumption the rule imposes. However, [p]laintiffs are not likewise
obligated to plead operative facts in their complaint that would rebut the
presumption.""' The Ohio Court found that the plaintiffs had
adequately pleaded that the Cincinnati Board was not protected by the
business judgment rule for the 2010 executive pay structure.2 " The Ohio
Court further stated that the Complaint provided factual allegations that
raised a plausible claim that the executive compensation structure
approved by the directors, in a time that the company's financial
performance was declining, violated Cincinnati Bell's "pay for
performance" policy and were not in the best interests of the shareholders
and constituted an "abuse of discretion and/or bad faith."2 41
The defendants also asked the Ohio Court to dismiss the suit, because
the plaintiffs did not make a demand upon the directors to sue
themselves.2 42 The Ohio Court held that the plaintiffs were excused from
the pre-suit demand.243 Ohio law permits "a shareholder to proceed with
a derivative suit without first making a demand if the shareholder can
demonstrate that the demand would have been futile."2"
To demonstrate futility, the plaintiffs have the burden of showing
"that 'the directors minds are closed to argument and that they cannot
properly exercise their business judgment in determining whether the suit
should be filed."' 2" Ohio courts have "'consistently rejected the idea that
demand is always futile when the directors are targeted as the wrongdoers
of the suit.'" 2" However, the Ohio Court also stated that "demand is
2 Id. (citing Radol, 772 F.2d at 257).
238 Cincinnati Bell Order, supra note 228, at *2 (citing In re Nat'l Century Fin. Enters. Inc., 504 F.
Supp. 2d. 287,312 (S.D. Ohio 2007); Marsalis v. Wilson, 778 N.E.2d 612, 616 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002)).
2 Cincinnati Bell Order, supra note 228, at *2 (quoting Marsais, 778 N.E.2d at 616)).
240 Id. at *3.
241 Id.
242 Id.
243 Id.
244 Cincinnati Bell Order, supra note 228, at *3 (citing Carlson v. Rabkin, 789 N.E.2d 1122, 1128
(Ohio Ct App. 2003)).
245 Id. (citing Cadson, 789 N.E.2d at 1128).
246 Id. at *4 (citing In re Ferro Corp., 511 F.3d 611, 618 (6th Cir. 2006)).
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presumptively futile 'where the directors are antagonistic, adversely
interested, or involved in the transactions attacked"' 247 and that under
Delaware law, a "pre-suit demand if excused when plaintiffs allegations
create a reasonable doubt that the challenged transaction is the result of a
valid business judgment."2 48
The Ohio Court found that the plaintiffs had pleaded specific facts
that gave reason to doubt that the directors could make unbiased,
independent business judgments about whether to bring a lawsuit. The
Ohio Court further found that "the defendants [] approved the pay hikes
and bonuses" and that the "directors did not merely approve the
transaction, they also recommended to the shareholders that the
shareholders approve the compensation." 249  Because the plaintiffs
demonstrated facts to show that the defendants "devised the challenged
compensation, approved the compensation, recommended shareholder
approval of the compensation, and suffered a negative shareholder vote on
the compensation," the Ohio Court found there was reason to doubt the
defendants could exercise their independent business judgment and
concluded that the plaintiffs' allegations created doubt that the challenged
transactions were the result of a valid business judgment and that the
defendants possessed a "disqualifying interest sufficient to render pre-suit
demand futile."250 The Ohio Court also found that since the plaintiffs
pleaded sufficient facts to show the defendants breached their fiduciary
duties to the corporation, the plaintiffs had also sufficiently pleaded a
claim for unjust enrichment.25 '
2. Beazer Homes Order
On September 16, 2011, the Georgia Court granted the defendants'
Motion to Dismiss. The defendants' motion was decided under Delaware
law.252 In the Beazer Homes Order, the defendants asked the Georgia
Court to dismiss the suit, claiming that the plaintiffs lacked standing to
bring suit and that the plaintiffs failed to make a pre-suit demand on the
247 Id. (quoting Ferro, 511 F.3d at 618).
248 Id. (citing McCall v. Scott, 239 F.3d 808, 816 (6th Cir. 2001)).
249 Id.
250 Id.
251 Id. at *5 (citingJackson Nat'l. Life Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 741 A.2d 377,394 (DeL Ch. 1999)).
252 See Beazer Homes Order, supra note 229, at 4 (citing Diedreich v. Miller & Meier & Assoc.
Architects & Planners, Inc., 334 S.E.2d 308, 310 (Ga. 1985)).
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Beazer Board.253 The Georgia Court held that the dismissal was
warranted on each of the grounds asserted by the defendants. 25
To have standing to sue derivatively, under Delaware law, plaintiffs
must have owned a company's stock "contemporaneously with the alleged
wrongful conduct about which they are complaining and to have held the
stock continuously since that time and throughout the duration of the
lawsuit."255  Plaintiffs are required to allege in the Complaint that they
satisfy the contemporaneous and continuous requirement of stock
ownership.256
In the Beazer Homes Complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that they had
continuously held Beazer Homes stock since May 2010.257 The Georgia
Court found that the decision that determined the 2010 executive
compensation structure that the plaintiffs were challenging occurred prior
to May 2010 and, therefore, the plaintiffs did not have standing to bring
the shareholder derivative lawsuit.258  The Georgia Court specifically
stated that "[p]laintiffs bought stock after Beazer's Compensation
Committee had established Beazer executives' 2010 base salaries and []
performance goals" and that the Georgia Court was not persuaded that
"[p]laintiffs' purchase of stock after the conditions on which challenged
pay would be awarded were established, albeit before the pay was actually
awarded pursuant to those pre-established terms, suffices to satisfy the
letter and spirit of the contemporaneous and continuous stock ownership
requirement."2s5
The Georgia Court also held that the plaintiffs failed to adequately
allege excuse for their failure to make a pre-suit demand on the Beazer
Board. 21 Under Delaware law, the plaintiffs must "make a pre-suit
demand on the company's board that it investigate and evaluate whether
to bring the claims or to plead particularized facts demonstrating legal
excuse from the demand requirement. "261 Demand excuse allegations
"'must comply with stringent requirements of factual particularity that
differ substantially from the permissive notice pleadings ... [and] is not
23 Id. at 4.
254 Id.
255 Id. (citing Strategic Asset Mgmt., Inc. v. Nicholson, No. Civ. A. 20360-NC, 2004 WL
2847875, at *2 (Del. Ch. Nov. 30,2004)).
256 Id. at 5 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. 8 S 327 (West 2011); Del. Ct. Ch. R. 23.1(a)).
2 Beazer Homes Complaint, supra note 79,118.
2ss Beazer Homes Order, supra note 229, at 6.
259 Id.
260 Id. at 7.
261 Id. (citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984); Del. Ch. Ct. R. 23.1(a)).
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satisfied by conclusory statement or mere notice pleading."' 262  In cases
where a claim is challenging a decision by a company's board of directors,
the test in Aronson will apply.263 Under Aronson, "where officers and
directors are under an influence which sterilizes their discretion, they
cannot be considered proper persons to conduct litigation on behalf of the
corporation. Thus, demand would be futile."2  The Court in Aronson
also "recognized that demand futility is inextricably bound to issues of
business judgment, but stated the test to be based on allegations of fact,
which, if true, 'show that there is a reasonable inference' the business
judgment rule is not applicable for purposes of a pre-suit demand."265
The Georgia Court first found that the plaintiffs' allegations that the
Beazer Board breached its fiduciary duties by approving the challenged
executive compensation package and recommending it to the shareholders
were unpersuasive.2 66 The Georgia Court held that the plaintiffs failed to
meet the first prong of the Aronson test, because only one member of the
Beazer Board was also an executive officer and alleged to have received
the compensation that plaintiffs were challenging and, therefore, the
plaintiffs did not allege that demand was excused because a majority of
Beazer Homes' directors lacked independence.267
The Georgia Court next analyzed whether the Beazer Board's
decision on executive compensation received protection under the
business judgment rule. The business judgment rule "is a presumption
that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on
an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action
taken was in the best interests of the company."26 8 The plaintiffs argue
that the adverse "say on pay" vote by a majority of shareholders
constituted evidence that rebutted the presumption that the Beazer
Board's decision approving the executive compensation package and
26 Id. (quoting Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A2d 244, 254 (Del. 2000)). It is important to note that the
plaintiffs are not required to plead evidence, only "particularized factual statements that are essential to the
claim."Barhm, 746 A2d at 254.
26 Beazer Homes Order, supra note 229, at 7-8.
264 Aronson, 473 A2d at 814.
265 Id. (quotingAronson, 466 A.2d at 381).
2 Beazer Homes Order, supra note 229, at 8.
2 Id.; Aronson, 473 A.2d at 816 ("Independence means that a director's decision is based on
the corporate merits of the subject before the board rather than extraneous considerations or
influences."); Pogostin v. Rice 480 A.2d 619, 624 (Del. 1984) ("Directorial interest exists whenever
divided loyalties are present, or a director either has received, or is entitled to receive, a personal
financial benefit from the challenged transaction which is not equally shared by the stockholders.").
268 Aronson v. LeWis, 473 A2d 805,812 (Del. 1984).
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recommending it to shareholders reflected a valid business judgment.269
The Georgia Court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments as unpersuasive.
The Georgia Court held that "because the say on pay vote had not yet
been held when the challenged decisions to approve the pay at issue and
recommend that shareholders vote to approve it were made, the Beazer
Board could not have considered the results of the vote in making those
decisions."270
The Georgia Court also held that plaintiffs' argument that they used
their own "independent business judgment" to rebut the presumption of
business judgment rule protection for the Beazer Board was not
supported by Delaware law or the Dodd-Frank Act itself.27' The Georgia
Court stated that the language of the Dodd-Frank Act "expressly
preserved the pre-existing fiduciary duty framework concerning executive
compensation decisions." 272 Delaware law gives directors wide discretion
to set executive compensation.2 73  The plaintiffs also argued that the
negative "say on pay" vote was evidence that the Court could consider to
rebut the "business judgment rule" presumption; however, the Georgia
Court stated that " [g] iven that Delaware law, which the Dodd-Frank Act
explicitly declined to alter, places authority to set executive compensation
with corporate directors, not shareholders, this Court will not conclude
that an adverse say on pay vote alone suffices to rebut the presumption of
business judgment protection applicable to directors' compensation
decisions."2 74
The Georgia Court also held that the "aiding and abetting" claims
against the executive compensation consultants (PwC and Markson) must
be dismissed, because the plaintiffs had not alleged any underlying breach
of fiduciary duties by the Beazer Board.275  The Georgia Court also
dismissed the unjust enrichment claim stating that "plaintiffs have not
269 Beazer Homes Complaint, supra note 79, 113.
270 Beazer Homes Order, supra note 229, at 10; see also In re Cox Radio, Inc. S'holders Litig.,
No. 4461-CVP, 2010 WL 1806616, at *14 (Del. Ch. May 6, 2010) ("While hindsight is generally
20/20, it cannot be used to second guess the business judgment of Delaware directors.").
271 Beazer Homes Order, supra note 229, at 11.
272 Id.
7 Id.; Haber v. Bell, 465 A.2d 353, 359 (Del. Ch. 1983) ("[Glenerally directors have the sole
authority to determine compensation levels."); Orban v. Field, No. Civ. A. 12829, 1997 WL 153831, at
*10 (Del. Ch. Apr. 1, 1997) ("Where ... a payment decision has been approved by a majority of
disinterested directors, it is entitled to the protection of the business judgment rule.").
274 Beazer Homes Order, supra note 229, at 12 (emphasis m original).
2s Id. at 20; Globis Partners, L.P. v. Plumtree Software, Inc., No. 1577-VCP, 2007 WL
4292024, at *15 (Del. Ch. Nov. 30, 2007) (dismissing aiding and abetting claim where plaintiff failed
to state a claim for underlying breach of fiduciary duty).
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alleged that the compensation awarded to the Beazer executives ... was in
any way inconsistent with those executives' achievement of performance
targets." 276
3. Umpqua Holdings Order
On January 11, 2012, the Oregon Court granted the defendants'
Motion to Dismiss. The defendants' motion was decided under Oregon
law.27 In the Umpqua Holdings Order, the defendants asked the Oregon
Court to dismiss the suit, claiming that the plaintiffs lacked standing to
bring suit and that the plaintiffs failed to make a pre-suit demand on the
Umpqua Board.2 78  The Oregon Court held that the dismissal was
warranted on each of the grounds asserted by the defendants.2 79
To have standing to sue derivatively, the plaintiffs must have owned
shares in the corporation at the time of the disputed transaction. Second,
the plaintiffs must "allege with particularity the efforts, if any, made by the
plaintiff to obtain the action the plaintiff desires from the directors."28 0 If
a demand was not made to the board, the plaintiffs may still initiate an
action where it is shown that such demand would have been futile.281
The Oregon Court held that the plaintiffs failed to adequately allege
excuse for their failure to make a pre-suit demand on the Umpqua Board.
In cases where a claim is challenging a decision by a company's board of
directors, the test in Aronson will apply.282 The first prong of the Aronson
test is "whether 'a shareholder [has pleaded] with particularity facts that
establish that demand would be futile because the directors are not
independent or disinterested.' The second prong of the test is whether 'a
276 Beazer Homes Order, supra note 229, at 10. "[T]he court cannot reasonably conclude that
the defendants were unjustly enriched when [the executives] received compensation for providing
services to [to the company] pursuant to a contractual agreement approved by the [company's]
board." Highland Legacy Ltd. v. Singer, No. Civ. A. 1566-N, 2006 WL 741939, at *7 n.73 (Del. Ch.
Ct. Mar. 17, 2006).
277 Umpqua Holdings Order, supra note 230, at *3 n.3 (citing Sommers v. Lewis, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 29776, at *8 (D. Or. Apr. 8, 2009) ("Demand futility is determined under the law of the
company's incorporating state-in this case, Oregon. This area of law is 'undeveloped' in Oregon, and
courts often look to Delaware law for guidance.")).
278 Id. at 1.
7 Id.
no Potter v. Hughes, 546 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S.
91, 96-97 (1957);
FED R CIV. P. 23.1.
281 Umpqua Holdings Order, supra note 230, at 7 (citingPoter, 546 F3d at 1056).
8 Id
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reasonable doubt is created that . . . the challenged transaction was
otherwise the product of a valid exercise of business judgment.' The two
prongs of the Aronson test are disjunctive, meaning that if either part is
satisfied, demand is excused."2
The Oregon Court first found that the plaintiffs' allegations that the
Umpqua Board breached its fiduciary duties by approving the challenged
executive compensation package and recommending it to the shareholders
were unpersuasive. 2" The Oregon Court held that the plaintiffs failed to
meet the first prong of the Aronson test, because only one member of the
Umpqua Board was also an executive officer and alleged to have received
the compensation that plaintiffs were challenging and, therefore, the
plaintiffs did not allege that demand was excused because a majority of
Umpqua Holdings' directors lacked independence.2 85 The plaintiffs also
cite to the Cincinnati Bell Holding that stated "the interest required to
excuse the demand required is present because the board members face a
substantial likelihood of liability in this derivative action."2 86 The Oregon
Court found this argument to be unpersuasive, finding that the
Cincinnati Bell case has recently been challenged on subject matter
jurisdiction grounds and the plaintiffs' failure to disclose contrary
authority in response to the court's specific inquiry in that case and also
found that the plaintiffs reasoning was circular.
The Oregon Court next analyzed whether the Umpqua Board's
decision on executive compensation received protection under the
business judgment rule. The business judgment rule is a "presumption
that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on
an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action
taken was in the best interests of the company."288  The plaintiffs argue
283 Umpqua Holdings Order, supra note 230, at *4 (citing In re J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.
Shareholder Litigation, 906 A.2d 808, 820 (Del. 2005)).
2 Umpqua Holdings Order, supra note 230, at *7.
285 Id. at *4 ("A director will be considered unable to act objectively with respect to a presuit
demand if he or she is interested in the outcome of the litigation or is otherwise not independent."
The proper focus of the inquiry is "whether the director's decision is based on the corporate merits of
the subject before the board, rather than extraneous considerations or influences." (quoting Beam v.
Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1048-49 (Del. 2004))).
"' Umpqua Holdings Order, supra note 230, at*5 (citing Cincinnati Bell Order, supra note 228).
n Id. at *5 ("Under [p]laintiffi' reasoning, the fact that presuit demand is itself suggestive of
impending liability is sufficient to create the type of self-interest that triggers the demand futility exception
This would permit every derivative action plaintiff to argue that demand is fistile and need not be made
because no board would be able to act objectively in evaluating a presuit demand.").
2a Umpqua Holdings Order, supra note 230, at *5 (quoting Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum
Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985)) (A court "will not substitute its judgment for that of the board if
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that the adverse "say on pay" vote by a majority of shareholders
constituted evidence that rebutted the presumption that the Umpqua
Board's decision approving the executive compensation package and
recommending it to shareholders reflected a valid business judgment.289
The Oregon Court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments as unpersuasive
and held that "the board's actions do not directly defy or violate any
Umpqua bylaw, any shareholder agreement, or any legally mandated
disclosure or reporting requirement. Instead, Plaintiffs rely on a policy,
pay for performance, that does not establish a binding standard for
compensation and, notably, the board's statement regarding pay for
performance was not made until after the compensation package had been
approved." 2' The Oregon Court also found that "[g]iven that Delaware
law, which the Dodd-Frank Act explicitly declined to alter, places
authority to set executive compensation with corporate directors, not
shareholders, this Court will not conclude that an adverse say on pay vote
alone suffices to rebut the presumption of business judgment protection
applicable to directors' compensation decisions."29 1
4. Comparison
It is instructive to compare the three decisions in Cincinnati Bell,
Beazer Homes, and Umpqua Holdings, because these are the first three
decisions to be handed down in the crop of "say on pay" shareholder
derivative lawsuits. The first point that needs to be made is that the
decisions were made in different courts under different laws. The
Cincinnati Bell case was heard in a federal court in Ohio applying Ohio
law. The Beazer Homes case was heard in a state court in Georgia
applying Delaware law. The Umpqua Holdings case was heard in a
federal court in Oregon applying Oregon law. As stated above, in
derivative claims brought under Federal law, the courts will apply the
substantive law of the state of incorporation to determine whether
demand is excused. 2" This is important for companies to note, since a
the latter's decision can be attributed to any rational business purpose."); see also Crandon v. Shelk, 181
P.3d 773, 782 (Or. Ct. App. 2008).
m Umpqua Holdings Complaint, supra note 94, 1 32.
2 Umpqua Holdings Order, supra note 230, at *8. ("Plaintiffs' allegation that the board violated the
pay for performance policy is not sufficient to overcome the business judgment presumption.") Id at 16.
2' Umpqua Holdings Order, supra note 230, at *8 (quoting Beazer Homes Order, supra note 229, at
12).
M See, e.g., Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Serv. Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 98 (1991); see also Burks v. Lasker,
441 U.S. 471, 478 (1979) (noting that corporations, as a rule, are creatures of state law).
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company may be incorporated in one state, but have its corporate
headquarters in a different state. Beazer Homes is perfect example, being
incorporated in Delaware and having its corporate headquarters in
Georgia, where the lawsuit was filed.
The first distinction that needs to be made is that the shareholders in
the Beazer Homes case were found to not have standing to bring a
derivative claim. As stated above, the Georgia Court found that the
alleged wrongful conduct cited by the plaintiffs occurred before they
became shareholders.293 This is very important, because even if the
Georgia Court found in favor of the plaintiffs substantively, procedure
would not have allowed the case to continue. The shareholders in
Cincinnati Bell and Umpqua Holdings did not face this obstacle.
The next distinction concerns the discussion of the companies' "pay
for performance" policies. In the Cincinnati Bell case, the Ohio Court
held that the allegations by the plaintiffs raised a plausible claim the
executive compensation approved by the directors, in a time that the
company's financial performance was declining, violated Cincinnati Bell's
"pay for performance" policy and were not in the best interests of the
shareholders.294 In the Beazer Homes case, the Georgia Court found that
the plaintiffs did not allege that the challenged compensation package was
inconsistent with executives' performance against predetermined financial
goals and targets.2 95 It will be important for shareholders to explicitly state
that the board of directors violated a company's "pay for performance"
compensation policies when they approved the executive compensation
structure.
The next distinction concerns the different pleading standards in the
Cincinnati Bell, Beazer Homes, and Umpqua Holdings cases. In the
Cincinnati Bell case, the Ohio Court stated "'the business judgment rule
imposes a burden of proof, not a burden of pleading.' 29 6  The Ohio
Court went on to state "while a plaintiff must plead an exception to the
business judgment rule, he is 'not required to plead the exception with
29 Beazer Homes Order, supra note 229, at 5.
29 Cincinnati Bell Order, supra note 228, at 5.
2s Beazer Homes Order, supra note 229, at 9. It is interesting to note that the plaintiffi stated that the
compensation package violated Beazer Homes' "pay for performance" executive compensation policy, but
they failed to list it in their causes of action. See Beazer Homes Complaint, supra note 79, 23 ("[Ijncreasing
2010 CEO and top executive pay ... was unreasonably excessive and violated Beazer's pay-for-performance
executive compensation policy.").
2 Cincinnati Bell Order, supra note 228, at 5 (quoting In re Nat'l Century Fin. Enters., Indiv.
Litig., 504 F. Supp. 2d 287, 312 (S.D. Ohio 2007)).
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particularity."' 2 97 In the Beazer Homes case, the Georgia Court stated that
"demand excuse allegations 'must comply with stringent requirements of
factual particularity ... [and] is not satisfied by conclusory statements or
mere notice pleading."' 29 8  In the Umpqua Holdings case, the Oregon
Court stated that demand excuse allegations must ""state with
particularity: any effort by the plaintiff to obtain the desired action from
the directors or comparable authority and, if necessary, from the
shareholders or members; and the reasons for not obtaining the action or
not making the effort."' 299 This distinction is very important, since it will
be state law that determines whether demand has been excused and the
remaining shareholder derivative lawsuits have all been filed in different
jurisdictions."
The next distinction concerns the business judgment rule. In the
Beazer Homes case, the Georgia Court held that the Dodd-Frank Act
"expressly preserved the pre-existing fiduciary duty framework
concerning executive compensation decisions" and concluded that an
adverse say on pay vote alone did not rebut the presumption of business
judgment protection applicable to directors' compensation decisions."' in
the Cincinnati Bell case, the Ohio Court held that the Cincinnati Board's
decisions to approve the compensation in light of the financial standing of
the company and the negative shareholder vote on the compensation
created doubt that the challenged transactions were the result of a valid
business judgment.302 In the Umpqua Holdings case, Oregon Court held
that the Umpqua Board's actions did not violate any Umpqua bylaw, any
shareholder agreement, or any legally mandated disclosure or reporting
requirement and also found that Umpqua Holding's "pay for
performance" policy did not establish a binding standard for
compensation.os
2' Id. (quotmg In re Tower Air, Inc, 416 F.3d 229, 236 (3rd Cir. 2005)).
298 Beazer Homes Order, supra note 229, at *4 (quoting Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 254
(Del. 2000)); see also Brehm, 746 A.2d at 255 ("Plaintiffs are entitled to all reasonable factual inferences
that logically flow from the particularized facts alleged, [although] conclusory allegations are not
considered as expressly pleaded facts or factual inferences.").
9 Umpqua Holdings Order, supra note 230, at*3 (quoting FED R CIV. P. 23.1(b)(3)).
0 The Jacobs Engineering case was filed in state court in California, the Umpqua Holdings case was
filed in federal court in Oregon, the Hercules Offihore case was filed in state court in Texas, theJanus Capital
case was filed in federal court in Colorado, and the Dex One case was filed in federal court in North Carolina.
30 Beazer Homes Order, supra note 229, at 6-7.
302 Cincinnati Bell Order, supra note 228, at 9.
30 Umpqua Holdings Order, supra note 230, at 14.
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Even though the Georgia Court ruled against the plaintiffs in the
Beazer Homes case, the use of the language that an adverse "say on pay"
vote alone does not rebut the presumption of business judgment rule
protection leaves open the possibility that if the plaintiffs can submit
additional evidence in combination with a negative "say on pay" vote, the
outcome may be different. This is a critical distinction from the Ohio
Court's reasoning in the Cincinnati Bell case, which found that the
negative "say on pay" vote on executive compensation was enough to
rebut the presumption of business judgment rule protection.
Another distinction is that in the Cincinnati Bell case, under Ohio
law, demand was presumptively futile where the directors were adversely
interested or involved in the transactions attacked."* Under Ohio law,
demand futility may also be established by suing all of the directors.30 s In
the Beazer Homes case, under Delaware law, to properly plead excused
demand, plaintiffs had to raise a reasonable doubt that the challenged
board decision was a valid exercise of business judgment or show that the
directors faced a substantial likelihood of personal liability.306 In the
Beazer Homes case, the Georgia Court also held that because the "say on
pay" vote had not yet been held when the executive compensation
structure was approved, the Beazer Board could not have considered the
results of the vote in making their decision.0 7 I will directly address this
concern of shareholders using hindsight when voting on executive
compensation structures when discussing my proposals for amending the
Dodd-Frank Act later in this article.308
It is also interesting to note that that the Cincinnati Bell Order was
recently "called into question in light of the court's apparent lack of
subject matter jurisdiction."0 9 However, even in light of this challenge,
Cincinnati Bell approved a settlement in the case. According to Phillip R.
Cox, Chairman of the Cincinnati Board, the settlement included "features
which will clarify the Company's executive compensation policies and
which will more clearly communicate these policies to our shareholders.
34 See id.
305 Carlson v. Rabkin, 789 N.E.2d 1122, 1128 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003) ("Examples of when
demand would be excused as futile include when all directors are named as wrongdoers and
defendants in a suit."); Drage v. Brunner, 694 N.E.2d 479, 483 (1997) ("when all directors are named
as wrongdoers/defendants in a suit, futility may exist.").
M See Beazer Homes Order, supra note 229 at 4.
N Beazer Homes Order, supra note 229, at 10.
M See infra Section V(A).
M See Order Granting Defendants' Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint and Notice of
Voluntary Dismissal, NECA-IBEWPension Fund v. Coa, No. 11-cv-451 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 21,2011).
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Importantly, the changes represented by this agreement should better
assist our shareholders' understanding of how these policies are applied to
covered employees.""o Even though the ruling in the Cincinnati Bell case
was challenged, because the case was settled on terms favorable to
shareholders, plaintiffs will view this as a reason to continuing bringing
shareholder derivative suits based upon negative "say on pay" votes on
executive compensation.
From looking at the three Orders, it is clear that courts are split on
whether shareholder derivative lawsuits based upon a negative "say on
pay" vote on executive compensation are viable. It is also important to
note that in the Beazer Homes and Umpqua Holdings cases, a state court
in Georgia and federal court in Oregon were interpreting Delaware law.
This will be a reoccurring theme, since many corporations are
incorporated in Delaware, but have their corporate headquarters in a
different state. Also, many courts look to Delaware law as a guide in cases
concerning corporate law."' A Delaware court may come to a different
conclusion.
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR COMPANIES
With shareholders bringing derivative claims based on negative "say
on pay" votes, companies can mitigate some of the risk by re-writing their
pay for performance policies and also by responding actively to a negative
"say on pay" vote on executive compensation.
310 Agreement Reached in Cincinnati Bell "Say on Pay" Lawsuit, CINCINNATI BELL, INC. (Dec. 20,
2011), http://investor.cincinnatibell.conphoenixzhtml?c= 111332&p= irol-newsArticle&ID=
1641587&highlight=.
311 See, e.g., Mullen v. Acad. Life Ins. Co., 705 F.2d 971, 974 n.3 (8th Cir. 1983) (per curiam)
("Courts of other states commonly look to Delaware law ... for aid in fashioning rules of corporate
law."); Sommers v. Lewis, 641 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1156 (D. Or. 2009) ("Oregon law is undeveloped in
[the area of corporate law], so the parties look to Delaware law.");Wieboldt Stores, Inc. v.
Schottenstein, 94 B.R. 488, 509 n.29 (N.D. Ill. 1988) ("Illinois courts have often looked to Delaware
law for guidance in deciding previously undecided corporate law issues."); Dixon v. Ladish Co., 785
F. Supp. 2d 746, 754 (E.D. Wis. 2011) ("Delaware law can serve as a guide to corporate law issues in
Wisconsin."); McMinn v. MBF Operating Acquisition Corp., 142 N.M. 160, 173 (N.M. 2007) (The
Supreme Court of New Mexico "find[s] the Delaware approach instructive, based upon its reasoning
and the experience of its courts in matters of corporate law."); Detwiler v. Offenbecher, 728 F. Supp.
103, 147 n.17 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) ("Michigan courts look to Delaware law as a guide for adjudicating
matters involving corporate law.").
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A. Re-Writing "Payfor Perfornance" Policies
As stated earlier in this article, according to some financial experts,
shareholders and institutional investors consider "pay for performance" as
an integral aspect of executive compensation.312 During the 2011 Proxy
Season, of the 340 recommendations by ISS to vote negatively on the
proposed executive compensation, 177, or about 52%, of the negative ISS
recommendations were based upon a company's "pay for performance"
misalignment. 313
When determining "pay for performance" alignment, ISS uses both a
quantitative and qualitative method.314  First, ISS screens companies to
identify the level of alignment between pay and performance over a
sustained period; if a company shows unsatisfactory alignment, then they
use a second-stage qualitative analysis to arrive at a final
recommendation. 3" During the quantitative analysis, ISS compares the
"company's total shareholder return rank within a peer group, as
measured over one-year and three-year periods, and the multiple of the
CEO's total pay relative to the peer group median."16 During the
qualitative analysis, ISS examines multiple factors to determine how
various pay elements may work to encourage or to undermine long-term
value creation and alignment with shareholder interests."
Commentators have opined that "an effective approach to setting
appropriate goals is to use probability analysis to determine the likelihood
of attaining different levels of performance."3 8 Research has shown that
consistently achieving goals set in this manner is associated with superior
returns to shareholders. 319  The analysis is based on rigorous analysis of
312 2011 ISS Report, supra note 172, at 9.
313 Id. at 5.
314 Id. at 9.
31s Martin Rosenbaum, ISS Policy Updates Shed Light on Pay-for-Performance Analysis, ON
SECURITIES (Nov. 20, 2011), http://www.onsecurities.com/2011/11/20/iss-policy-updates-shed-light-
on-payforperformance-analysis.
316 Id. ("The peer group is generally comprised of 14 to 24 companies selected based on size and
industry group.").
317 Id. These factors may include "the ratio of performance- to time-based equity awards;" "the ratio
of performance-based compensation to overall compensation;" "the completeness of disclosure and rigor of
performance goals;" and "any other factors deemed relevant" Id.
318 Eric Marquadt & Matt Arnold, Setting Performance Goals in the New Disclosure Environment,
BOARDROOM IQ (Sept. 9, 2011) httpV//www.boardroomiq.com/indexphpleadership/category/
chrocompensation committee/setting performance goals in-the newdisclosure environment.
319 Id.
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historical and expected performance data for the company and its peers.320
Because the analysis considers data from peer companies, it can help
directors to set performance goals that are both competitive and
realistic. 32 1 The experts warn though that this analysis is not a substitute
for business judgment; instead they are a foundation that directors can use
to make sound goal-setting decisions."
Companies need to "pay special attention to the rationale for
compensation decisions where the company has underperformed its
designated peers or the industry, even as executive compensation has
increased. Even if not required as part of determining performance under
the company's executive compensation plans, the compensation
committee should review the company's one-, three- and five-year
performance and total compensation relative to these groups."
Companies should also be aware of the "programs and or
recommendations about pay decisions that may not conform to current
trends in executive compensation, even where the deviations may be
justified."3 24
A valuable guide for setting "pay for performance" policies is the
Financial Stability Board's.. Principles for Sound Compensation
Practices.326 The FSB implementation standards were aimed at aligning
compensation with long-term value creation.3 27 The elements include:
(i) avoiding multi-year guaranteed bonuses; (ii) requiring a
significant portion of variable compensation to be deferred, tied to
performance and subject to appropriate clawback and to be vested
in the form of stock or stock-like instruments, as long as these
create incentives aligned with long-term value creation and the
320 Id.
321 Id.
322 Id.
323 Edward F. Greene, Say-on-Pay and the BusinessJudgment Rule, THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL
FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REGULATION (Nov. 26, 2011),
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2011/11/26/say-on-pay-and-the-business-judgment-rule/.
324
325 The Financial Stability Board ("FSB") was established to "address vulnerabilities and to develop
and implement strong regulatory, supervisory and other policies in the interest of financial stability."
FINANCIAL STABIuY BOARD, httpVAvww.fnancialstabilityboard.org (last visited Jan. 10, 2012).
326 FSB Principles for Sound Compensation Practices, FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD (Sept. 25,
2009), http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_090925c.pdf.
3 Leaders' Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit Sept 24-25, 2009, G-20, available at
http//www.treasury.gov/resource-centerlmternationaVg7-g2(Documents/pittsburgh sununitleaders_
statement_250909.pdf (last visited Aug 15,2012).
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time horizon of risk; (iii) ensuring that compensation for senior
executives and other employees having a material impact on the
firm's risk exposure align with performance and risk; (iv) making
firms' compensation policies and structures transparent through
disclosure requirements; (v) limiting variable compensation as a
percentage of total net revenues when it is inconsistent with the
maintenance of a sound capital base; and (vi) ensuring that
compensation committees overseeing compensation policies are
able to act independently.32 8
"Pay for performance" has become a hot topic in recent years in the
corporate arena and companies should avoid making broad policy
assertions and fail to appropriately address the nuanced explanations of
how the pay for performance policy will be applied in both good and bad
economic times.329 Many proxy statements also suffer from not being
user-friendly, because the drafting of the report focuses on "ticking the
boxes" and complying with the detailed regulations that apply to proxy
statements.33o Companies must realize the importance of the language
they use in their policies when linking executive compensation to
company performance and disclosures "should be drafted carefully to
ensure that the disclosure adequately and accurately reflects the actual
compensation decisions made with respect to each aspect of an executive's
compensation. "331
B. Responding to a Negative "Say on Pay" Vote
If a company receives a negative "say on pay" vote, it is important for
its board of directors to actively respond. According to a recent PwC
study, 72% of U.S. companies would be willing to reconsider executive
compensation if the company received a negative "say on pay" vote on
executive compensation. 332
328 Id. at 8-9.
3 Id. at 9.
330 Karen Evans-Cullen & Jasmine Sprange, Australia: The two strikes rule: how has it played out?,
MONDAQ (Jan. 18, 2012), http://www.mondaq.com/australiaWx/158780/Directors+Officers+
Executives+Shareholders/The+two+strikes+ rule+ how+ has+ it+ played+ out.
331 Amy M. Shepherd, Say-On-Pay and the Cincinnati Bell and Beazer Homes Decisons, BAKER
HOSTETLER (Oct. 12, 2011), http/www.bakerlaw.cornalerts/say-on-pay-and-the-icmcnmati-bell-and-
beazer-homes-decisions-10-12-2011.
332 ANNUAL CORPORATE DIRECTOR SURVEY 2011 FINDINGS, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS
4, httpV/www.pwc.corf/enUS/us/corporate-governance/assets/annual-corporate-director-survey-
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Companies may look at the language used by the Georgia Court in
the Beazer Homes Order that stated "the say on pay vote did not require
that challenged pay be rescinded and does not support a reasoned
inference that any alleged failure to do so was not a valid business
judgment" and that there was "nothing to suggest that the Beazer Board's
failure to rescind the challenged pay rebuts the business judgment rule or
suffices to excuse demand."" However, this language should not
persuade a company to not actively respond to a negative "say on pay"
vote.
If a company receives a negative "say on pay" vote, the board of
directors should consider whether changes should be made to the
executive compensation structure. The board of directors should also
make sure any changes they make to the executive compensation structure
are made public in a timely manner, especially to the shareholders.
"While companies should not make substantive compensation decisions
that they do not believe are in the best interests of shareholders merely in
the hopes of increasing support for their say on pay proposals, changes
may be appropriate where a company feels upon reflection that its
compensation arrangements could be improved based on feedback from
its shareholders." Even if a company decides not to take action after a
negative "say on pay" vote, the Board should include a reasoned analysis
explaining why the executive compensation package remains
appropriate.
In a November 2011 speech, Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman of the
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), discussed how companies
that receive a negative "say on pay" vote on executive compensation
should respond."' She stated that companies should ask themselves very
tough questions concerning their execute compensation practices. The
questions would include: "Should executive compensation policies be
altered in response to the vote?" "[h]as the board's executive
compensation philosophy been clearly articulated to shareholders?" and
2011.pdf (last visited April 15,2012) [hereinafter PWC 2011 DIRECTOR SURVEY].
33 Beazer Homes Order, supra note 229, at 13.
334 Jeremy L. Goldstein, How to Win the Say on Pay Vote, THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM
ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REGULATION (Dec. 1, 2011, 9:31 AM),
http//blogs.law. harvard.edulcorpgov/2011/12/01/how-to-win-the-say-on-pay-vote/.
33 Id.
336 Mary L. Shapiro, Speed by SEC Chainnan: Remarks to TheCorporateCounse.Net "Say-on-Pay
Workshop Confren," U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Nov. 2, 2011),
httpV/www.sec.gov/news'speecb/2011/spchl1021lmls.htm.
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"[s]ubstantively, what should the Board consider changing about its
compensation plans?""'
As an example, Helix Energy systems, a company that received a
negative "say on pay" vote in 2011, stated that it would add performance
metrics to its 2011 cash bonus program for executive compensation.3  It
is unclear whether this type of action will convince shareholders to
withdraw the current derivative lawsuits or stop them from filing future
derivative lawsuits, but even if shareholders file suit based upon a negative
"say on pay" vote on executive compensation, actions taken to respond
positively to a negative "say on pay" vote could be looked on favorably by
the court. The amendment to the Dodd-Frank Act proposed later in this
article will force companies to respond to a negative "say on pay" vote and
inform shareholders whether any action has been taken, or in the
alternative, why action has not been taken.339
V. AMENDING THE DODD-FRANK ACT
This article has discussed, in detail, multiple derivative lawsuits
brought by shareholders after a negative "say on pay" vote on executive
compensation. This section of the article discusses amending the Dodd-
Frank Act to give shareholders greater influence over the decisions made
by a company and its board of directors concerning executive
compensation. The amendment would provide that a second successive
negative "say on pay" vote (50% or more of shareholder votes cast against
the proposed executive compensation package) on executive
compensation would prompt a vote on a "spill" resolution and, if that
resolution passes, all directors, except for the managing director, must
stand for re-election at a special "spill" meeting within 90 days of annual
shareholder meeting where the "spill" resolution passed.
A. Implementing a "Two-Strikes" "Say on Pay" Re-Election Policy for
Directors
1. Language of the Proposed Amendment
This article proposes an amendment to the Dodd-Frank Act that
would provide that a second successive negative "say on pay" vote (50% or
337 Id.
338 2011 ISS Report, supra note 172, at 19.
3 See infra Section V(A)(2).
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more of shareholder votes cast against the proposed executive
compensation package) on executive compensation would prompt a vote
on a "spill" resolution and, if that resolution passes, all directors, except
for the managing director, must stand for re-election at a special "spill"
meeting within 90 days of annual shareholder meeting where the "spill"
resolution passed. The proposed amendment is based on a recently
enacted Australian law which is referred to as the "two-strikes" rule.
This amendment would be codified as the new 15 U.S.C. S 78n-1(d).
The amendment would be codified as:
(d) Two Successive Negative Shareholder Votes
(1) If a company receives a negative shareholder vote (50% or
more of shareholder votes cast against the proposed executive
compensation package) on the compensation of executives
(referred to in subsection (a)), in the subsequent proxy statement,
the company must explain any response taken to the negative
shareholder vote or explain why they did not take any action and
the company must also include provisions for a "spill" resolution
at the following annual shareholder meeting;
(2) If a company receive receives a second successive negative
shareholder vote (50% or more of shareholder votes cast against
the proposed executive compensation package) on the
compensation of executives (referred to in subsection (a)), the
shareholders will vote on the "spill" resolution and, if the
resolution passes (50% or more of shareholder votes cast in favor
of the resolution), all directors, except the managing director,
must stand for re-election:
(i) the "spill" meeting must be held within 90 days of the
annual shareholder meeting where the "spill" resolution passed;
(ii) all of the company's directors who were directors of the
company at the time of the second successive negative shareholder
vote will cease to hold office immediately before the "spill"
meeting;
(iii) shareholders that have continuously held at least 5
percent of the voting power of the company's securities entitled to
be voted for at least three years may nominate directors to be
voted on at the "spill" meeting;
(iv) resolutions to appoint persons to offices that will be
3 See Improving Accountability on Director and Executive Remuneration Act, 2011, No. 42
(Austl.).
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vacated immediately before the end of the "spill" meeting must be
put to the vote at the "spill" meeting;
(v) to ensure that a company has the minimum amount of
directors required by law, the persons that will be appointed are
those with the highest number of votes favouring their
appointment, even if less than 50% of the votes cast were in
favour of their appointment;
(v) if a director who ceased to hold office immediately before
the "spill" meeting is appointed as director by resolution passed at
the "spill" meeting, his or her term of office runs as if the
cessation and appointment had not happened;
(vi) if the company does not hold the "spill" meeting within
90 days after the annual shareholder meeting where the "spill"
resolution was passed, each director will be personally fined $1000
dollars per day until the meeting is held.
(3) Executive officers that hold any of the voting power of the
company's securities to be voted will not be allowed to vote on the
compensation of executives (referred to in subsection (a)) or on
the "spill" resolution (referred to in subsection (d)(2)).
(4) Companies with less than $250,000,000 in total assets are
exempted from this Section.
2. Interpretation ofProposed Amendment
Under this proposed amendment, the first strike occurs when at least
50% of the eligible votes cast oppose the executive compensation
structure. This triggers a duty by the company to explain any response (or
non response) to the "say on pay" vote. Following the receipt of one
strike, companies must include on the Proxy Statement for the next
annual shareholder meeting a "spill" resolution. To the extent that 50%
of the shareholder votes are cast against the executive compensation
structure and the "spill" resolution passes, all directors except the
managing director must stand for re-election.34 '
Shareholders that have continuously held at least 5 percent of the
voting power of the company's securities entitled to be voted for at least
three years may nominate directors to be voted upon at the "spill"
meeting. If shareholders at the "spill" meeting don't appoint enough
directors to ensure that the company keeps its required minimum number
341 See Explanatory Memorandum, Improving Accountability on Director and Executive
Remuneration Act, 2011, No. 42 (Ausd.).
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of directors,34 2 vacancies are fllled by those directors who received the
highest number of votes even if they didn't receive enough votes to be
formally elected. If a company receives a negative "say on pay" vote year
after year, there will be no requirement to hold a "spill" vote if one was
held at the previous year's annual shareholder meeting. Also, because a
company will not know whether they will receive a second successive
negative "say on pay" vote at the annual shareholder meeting, the notice of
meeting and proxy forms will have to make provision for voting on a
"spill" resolution. Executive officers who hold shares of common stock
are also prohibited from voting on their own compensation awards and
companies that have less than $250,000,000 in total assets will not be
subject to this regulation.
B. Cost-Benefit Analysis
It is important to provide a comprehensive study on how this
proposed amendment would affect companies and their shareholders.343
It is imperative to look at both economic and non-economic factors and
try to foresee both positive and negative impact the legislation will have.
It is instructive to look at the regulation impact statement on
Australia's "two-strikes" rule, since that is what the proposed Amendment
to the Dodd-Frank Act in this article is based. The Productivity
Commission ("PC"), who prepared the regulation impact statement for
the Australian Treasury, reported that the "two-strikes" rule was the best
option, as compared to both a binding and non-binding shareholder vote
on executive compensation.3" The report found that a "two-strikes"
policy would address the problems associated with executive
compensation and "provide an additional level of accountability for
directors and increased transparency for shareholders. 3 45 The PC found
that where a company "faces significant 'no' votes over two consecutive
years, and the company has not adequately responded to concerns raised
by shareholders the previous year, it is appropriate for the boards of such
companies to be subject to greater scrutiny and accountability through the
342 The minimum number of directors is based on state law and/or a company's articles of
ncorporation.
3 Under President Clinton's Executive Order 12866 and the Unfunded Mandates Reform
Act of 1995, federal agencies are required to analyze the costs, benefits, and other effects of proposed
regulations. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993-2000), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. S 601 (1994),
and in 2 U.S.C. S 1501 (2011).
344 See Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 341.
34 Id.
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re-election process" and that the "two-strikes" rule "strengthens the non-
binding vote and maintains the fundamental principle underlying [the]
corporate governance framework that directors are responsible for, and
accountable to, shareholders on all aspects of the management of the
company, including the amount and composition of executive
remuneration."346
Australian directors have also backed the "two-strikes" rule
implemented in Australia. Many company directors believe the "two
strikes" rule has re-empowered boards in discussions with management
on the issue of executive compensation. 47 Insurance Australia Group
("IAG") director Yasmin Allen stated "while she initially believed the two
strikes reforms were too heavy handed, she now thought the changes had
improved dialogue in boardrooms on executive pay."348 Respected fund
manager John Sevior has also backed the "two-strikes" rule by stating that
"[t]o hear widespread criticism of the two-strikes rule from high-profile
sections of the directors' club means it is a step in the right direction. 3 49
Data compiled by Investor Weekly, a national online news and
information service for Australian investors, shows that about 9% of ASX
200350 companies received a negative vote against their remuneration
report. That figure is down from a three-year average of about 14%."sl
There is empirical evidence that "some boards [] made extra effort to
communicate their position on executive pay matters to superannuation
funds, fund managers, proxy advisers and retail investor groups."35 2
Even with mostly positive feedback for the "two strikes" rule in
Australia, American companies will be wary of any new regulation
concerning executive compensation. Companies will argue that the
proposed amendment would have a large effect on the economy and
entire industries would be impacted. This argument is unpersuasive. As
noted above, as ofJune 2011, shareholders returned negative "say on pay"
346 Id.
3 Damon Kitney, Dirators Back Two-Strike Rule at 50pc, (Dec. 19, 2011, 12:00AM),
httpV/ww.theaustralian.com.au/business/companie/directors-back-two-strike-rule-at-50pc/story-fn91v9q3-
1226225266729.
348 Id.
3 James Frost, Sevior Backs Executive Two-Strikes Pay Rule, THE AUsTRAUIAN (Oct. 29, 2011),
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/companies/sevior-backs-executive-two-strikes-pay-
rule/story-fn9lv9q3-1226179957662.
3so Australia's 200 largest stocks by market capitalization.
3 Tony Featherstone, Two Strikes Round One, MORNINGSTAR.COM,
http://www.morningstar.com.au/funds/article/two-strikes/4311 (last visited Mar. 2, 2012).
352 Id.
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votes at only 45, or 1.9%, of companies."s' This number reflects that over
98% of "say on pay" votes were positive. The empirical evidence suggests
that "say on pay" votes are negative only in the most egregious of
circumstances and for the "two strikes" regulation to apply, there would
have to be two successive negative "say on pay" votes. The proposed
amendment also exempts companies with less than $250,000,000 in total
assets.354
Companies will argue that the legislature and the courts have given
board of directors' wide discretion in the area of executive compensation.
Courts have stated that directors, rather than shareholders, manage the
business and affairs of the corporation.3" They will argue that directors'
authority to manage the affairs of a company includes "wide discretion" to
set executive compensation.3 "6  They will also argue that "informed
decisions regarding employee compensation by independent board are
usually entitled to business judgment rule protection."" Historically, as
discussed above, directors' have great latitude when it comes to decisions
on executive pay.
However, in recent years, courts have chipped away at that "wide
discretion" given to directors. In a recent decision from the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York, the District Court held that
directors and executive compensation consultants "have a skewed focus
when it comes to executive compensation, concentrating on what they
perceive is necessary to attract and keep 'talent' (however defined), and
more generally favoring ever larger compensation packages, while rarely
taking account of limits that a reasonable shareholder might place on such
expenditures."" Judge Richard A. Posner, dissenting in a 7  Circuit
Court of Appeals case, stated that "executive compensation in large
publicly traded firms often is excessive because of the feeble incentives of
boards of directors to police compensation."s' Courts have also found
that there is an outer limit to the directors' discretion, at which point a
decision of the directors on executive compensation is so
3 See Equilar Report, supra note 41 at 1.
3 This provision makes the regulation fair for smaller companies, because smaller companies with
lower levels of assets generally do not have the ability to award excessive executive compensation packages.
3ss Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984).
3 Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 262 n.56 (Del. 2000); Haber v. Bell, 465 A.2d 353, 359
(Del. Ch. 1983) (explaining that "generally directors have the sole authority to determine
compensation levels").
3 Prod. Res. Grp., LLC v. NCT Grp., Inc, 863 A2d 772, 799 (Del. Ch. 2004).
358 SEC v. Bank ofAm, 09 Civ. 6829,2010 U.S. Dist LEXIS 15460 at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2010).
3 Jones v. Harris, 537 F.3d 728, 730 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, J., dissenting).
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disproportionately large as to be unconscionable and constitute waste.
These cases show that even though directors have wide discretion in
setting executive compensation, it is not unlimited and may be challenged.
Implementation of a "two-strikes" regulation under the Dodd-Frank
Act will not alter the principle that directors are responsible for managing
a company's operations, including setting executive compensation. It will,
however, provide an additional level of accountability for directors and
also provide increased transparency for shareholders."' During a
parliamentary debate concerning Australia's "two-strikes" rule, Australian
House Representative Gai Brodtmann stated that the legislation was "a
step forward in ensuring that shareholders and Australians generally have
faith in the accountability of directors and senior executives of Australian
companies and, most importantly, in the fairness of their pay. It does this
not by regulation but by an approach that respects the need for firms to
operate freely in the market, at the same time giving shareholders the
power they need to make sure that senior executives truly earn their
pay." 1362
This "two-strikes" regulation will still leave power with the board to
set executive compensation, but the board will find itself subject to the
equivalent of a vote of confidence." "The failure to obtain approval
effectively amounts to a vote of 'no confidence' in the remuneration
committee, is regarded as a significant blow to the board's authority and is
typically widely reported."3" The threat of being removed by
shareholders can also give directors the leverage to stand up to assertive
managers. 6 s The disruptive effect of a board "spill" will also minimize
the perception that high levels of executive compensation are the result of
chummy negotiations between directors and executive officers.6
36 See Saxe v. Brady, 184 A.2d 602, 610 (Del. Ch. 1962); see also Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d
1207, 1215 (Del. 1996) (explaining that directors have discretion to set executive compensation levels
"unless the facts show that such amounts, compared with the services to be received in exchange,
constitute waste or could not otherwise be the product of a valid exercise of business judgment").
361 See Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 341.
362 Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Debate, S. House of Representatives, No. 5, 2011
(statement of Rep. Brodtmann).
36 Jeremy Ryan Delman, Structuring Say-On-Pay.A Comparative Look at Global Variations in Shareholder
Voting on Executive Compensation, 2010 COLUM. BUS. L REV. 583,613 (2010).
3& Guido Ferrarini, Niamh Moloney, & Maria Cristina Ungureanu, Understanding Directors'
Pay in Europe: A Comparative and Empirical Analysis 17 (European Corporate Governance Institute
Working Paper No. 126/2009, 2009), available at http-//papers.ssrn.con/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid= 1418463&rec= 1&srcabs= 1425469.
365 Id.
36 Id.
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Companies will also argue that an advisory "say on pay" vote is
enough and that shareholders already have the power to remove directors
if they believe they are not meeting expectations. However, this is easier
said than done. Regarding the advisory "say on pay" vote argument,
Richard Ferlauto, Director of Pension and Benefit Policy at American
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees ("AFSCME"),
testified before Congress that "[a] large shareholder vote against a pay
report is the yellow card warning to the company board. If this warning is
not heeded and pay practices are not reformed and better aligned with
performance, then shareholders have the opportunity to use the red card
by replacing failed directors."36 7
Regarding the removal of directors, the primary role of shareowners is
to elect and remove directors, but there are major hurdles for
shareholders to overcome.16 ' Lucian Bebchuk, Director of the Program
on Corporate Governance at Harvard Law School, has written that
"[s]hareholders' power to replace directors plays a critical role in the
accepted view of the corporation" and that the "safety valve of potential
ouster via ballot box - on which our corporate governance system is
supposed to rely - has been all but shut off. "36  Companies have argued
that the board is in a better position to nominate qualified directors than
shareholders are; however, the U.S. Supreme Court has stated that
directors should not "attribute to investors a child-like simplicity."7 o
367 Empowering Shareholders on Executive Compensation: Hearing on H.R. 1257 Before the H. Comm.
on Financial Servs., 110th Cong. (2007) (testimony of Richard Ferlauto, Director of Pension and
Benefit Policy, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees).
68 INVESTORS' WORKING GROUP, U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: THE
INVESTORS' PERSPECTIVE 27 (2009), http://www.cii.orgfUserFiles/file/
resource%20center/investment%20issues/Investors%27%2Working/o2OGroup% 2OReport% 2 0 %28Jul
y/o202009%29.pdf.
369 Jeremy Ryan Delman, Survey: Strcturing Say-On-Pay: A Comparative Look at Global
Variations in Shareholder Voting on Executive Compensation, 2010 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 583, 613 n.190
(2010) (citing LUCIAN BEBCHUK &JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 207-08 (2004)). Lucian Bebchuk & Jesse Fried, PAY
WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 23 (2004).
Professor Bebchuk has also stated "attempts to replace directors are extremely rare, even in firms that
systematically under-perform over a long period of time. By and large, directors nominated by the
company run unopposed and their election is thus guaranteed" and that "[w]hether the nomination
committee is controlled by the CEO or by independent directors, incentives to serve the interests of
those making nominations are not necessarily identical with incentives to maximize shareholder
value." Lucian Bebchuk, Shareholder Access to the Ballot (Regulatory Policy Program Working Paper
RPP-2003-16).
3o Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 US 224, 234 (1988) (quoting Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F2d 1169, 1175
(7th Cir. 1987)).
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Also, given that the shareholders stake in the company and money are on
the line, they naturally would have an incentive to make the decision that
would best serve their interests, i.e. nominating directors that will increase
the profitability of the company."'
The SEC recently tried to make it easier for shareholders to include
shareholder nominees for director on company proxy materials. This
regulation would require companies to "include shareholder nominees for
director in the company's proxy materials, if the shareholder meets certain
conditions, and if the shareholders are not otherwise prohibited - either
by applicable state or foreign law or a company's governing documents -
from nominating a candidate for election as a director."3 72 However, in
July 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
invalidated the regulation and the SEC has decided not to appeal the
ruling.37 3
By amending the Dodd-Frank Act, it will also cut down on costs
associated with litigation. If shareholders can use the "say on pay" vote to
affect the directors' decision concerning executive compensation, they will
not have to file a derivative shareholder suit. This would save both the
company and shareholders from paying court costs and lawyers' fees,
along with costs associated with litigation (discovery costs, labor costs,
etc.). The proposed amendment to the Dodd-Frank Act will solve the
problems shareholders are trying to resolve with litigation, namely,
whether directors will have to actively respond to their "say on pay" vote
in executive compensation.
The vote on the "spill" resolution after two successive negative "say
on pay" votes will also moot the argument made by the Georgia Court in
the Beazer Homes case that stated "because the say on pay vote had not
yet been held when the challenged decisions to approve the pay at issue
and recommend that shareholders vote to approve it were made, the
Beazer Board could not have considered the results of the vote in making
those decisions."37 4 The directors will have a year to either change the
executive compensation structure for the company or, in the alternative,
371 Bebchuk, supra note 369, at 15.
3 See US SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, SEC Adopts New Measures to Facilitate
Director Nominations by Shareholders (Aug. 25, 2010), http:/www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-
155.htm.
m See Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011); see also Jessica Holzer,
No Appeal on SEC Proxy Rule, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 8, 2011), http;//online.wsj.com/'
article/SB10001424053111904900904576555253963782370.html?mod=googlenews wsj.
37 Beazer Homes Order, supra note 229, at 11.
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convince the shareholders to vote in favor of the executive compensation
structure at the next annual shareholder meeting.
C. Policy Considerations
There are many policy considerations when amending a regulation or
statute. This is even truer when looking at a controversial law, such as the
Dodd-Frank Act. Robert Monks, a veteran corporate governance activist
who founded ISS in 1985, stated that "[s]ay-on-pay is at best a diversion
and at worst a deception" and "[y] ou only have the appearance of reform,
and it's a cruel hoax."375
There is a growing concern regarding excessive executive
compensation packages. The current median pay of CEOs sits at $11.4
million, according to the The American Federation of Labor ad Congress
of Industrial Organizations ("AFL-CIO"). 7 ' According to a study by the
Institute for Policy Studies ("IPS"),37 1 "two years into the worst economic
crisis since the Great Depression, executive pay - after adjusting for
inflation - is still running at double the 1990s CEO pay average,
quadruple the 1980s average, and eight times the average executive pay in
the mid-20th century."37 ' According to a Global Market Insite, Inc.
("GMI")379 survey, executive compensation has risen 36.5% in just the last
year.so A recent PwC study found that in 2010, 44% of corporate
directors believed that U.S. companies are having trouble controlling the
size of CEO compensation.
This is concerning, especially because the IPS study also reported that
"American workers, by contrast, are taking home less in real weekly wages
3s John Helyar, Investor 'Say on Pay' Is a Bust, BUSINESSWEEK.COM (June 16, 2011),
http:/www.businessweek.con/magazine/content/11_26(b4234023747122.htm.
376 Trends in CEO Pay, AFL-CIO, http/www.aflcio.org/Corporate-Watch/CEO-Pay-and-the-
99/Trends-in-CEO-Pay (last visited Mar. 3, 2012); see also Dale Wannen, How Shareholders are Battling
Excessive Executive Compensation, TRIPLE PUNDIT (June 30, 2011), http://www.triplepundit.conV
2011/06/staying-engaged-bosss-paycheck/.
3n IPS is a progressive think tank based in Washington, DC.
378 Sarah Anderson, Chuck Collins, Sam Pizzigan & Kevin Shih, CEO Pay and the Great
Recession, INSTITUTE FOR POLIcY STUDIES (Sept. 1, 2010), available at http://www.fpif.org/
files/2433/EE-2010-web.pdf
37 GMI is a market research firm headquartered in Bellevue, Washington.
380 Greg Ruel, Michelle Lamb & Paul Hodgson, GMls 2011 CEO Pay Survey, GMI RATINGS (Dec.
2011), httpV/origin.ibrary.constantcontactconVdownload/get/file/1102561686275-
61/GMI CEOPay201I_122011.pdf.
381 PwC 2011 DIRECTORSURVEY, supra note 332, at 25.
ENDING THE SILENCE
than they took home in the 1970s."3" The AFL-CIO found that in 1980,
CEO pay equaled 42 times the average blue collar worker's pay and by
2010, CEO pay had grown to 343 times workers' median pay. Even
more concerning is the report's finding that "CEOs at the 50 major firms
that have laid off the most workers since the onset of the economic crisis
took home nearly $12 million each on average in 2009, 42 percent more
than the average compensation that went to S&P 500 CEOs." 3  Robert
Reischauer, head of the Urban Institute"'s and former director of the
Congressional Budget Office, stated that the issue of executive
compensation can also be more symbolic than substantive.38 ' Reischauer
states that "[executive compensation] is an important symbol [and that] in
other countries, CEOs are not making a thousand times more than factory
workers."3"
D. Comparative Study
In July 2011, a group of European scholars conducted an experiment
to study the consequences of "different shareholder voting right regimes
on CEOs' investment incentives, shareholders' voting behavior, executive
compensation, and firm profit."" The study considered three different
types of shareholder voting right regimes and compared them to a system
in which shareholders had no "say on pay" vote on executive
389
compensation.
The experiment reported that "advisory shareholder voting rights do
not reduce compensation. We even find that nonenforceable voting rights
have an adverse effect on executive pay. In fact, they seem to motivate
CEOs to demand higher bonuses compared to the scenario where
shareholders have no voting rights. The latter effect is small but
3 Id. at 4.
38 For calculations, see AFL-CIO, Executive Pay Watch, www.paywatch.org (last visited Mar. 3,
2012).
3 Anderson, et al., supra note 378, at 5.
385 The Urban Institute is a non-partisan think-tank based in Washington, DC.
3 Albert R Hunt, CGporate Chiefi May Come to Rue Fat Paydays, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 19, 2007),
httpVAww.bloombergconapps/newspid=newsarchive&refer=columnisthuntasid=arth8j9wbrcc.
387 Id.
3 Robert F. G6x, Fr6d&ic Imhof, & Alexis H. Kunz, Say on Pay Design and its Repercussion
on CEO Investment Incentives, Compensation and Firm Profit (Apr. 13, 2010), available at
http//ssrn.com/abstract= 1588682.
389 Id.
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statistically significant."3" The report also stated unconditional binding
"say on pay" votes can "distort CEO investment incentives which results
in reduced firm profits;" however, "[t]hese negative consequences can be
avoided by conditionally binding voting rights."3 9' The "two-strikes"
regulation proposed in this article strikes a balance between the interests
of shareholders and a desire of business to give appropriate incentives to
their executives to generate growth.
It is also instructive to look at countries that have mandated binding
shareholder "say on pay" votes on executive compensation. As noted
earlier in this article, the Netherlands (2004), Sweden (2007), Denmark
(2007), and Norway (2007) have enacted regulations requiring companies
to submit executive remuneration to a binding vote."* The legislation in
these countries requires a binding vote where shareholders approve the
compensation policies of the company. The remuneration vote is on
future policies rather than a retroactive look at policies implemented in
the prior year and if shareholders vote against a new policy or changes to a
previously implemented policy, the company can only rely upon past
practices. 9
In 2004, the Netherlands adopted the Tabaksblat Code, which made
compliance with corporate governance principles (code of best practices)
mandatory by law.394 Under the Tabaksblat Code, the vote covers pay
policy only, not the remuneration report itself; this means "Dutch
shareholders vote only on the principles that will be used to devise the
following year's pay package." 39  If shareholders vote down the new
policy, the existing one remains in effect.9 In 2007, Sweden adopted a
binding senior management remuneration policy which states that "[t] he
board is to present a proposal for the company's policy on remuneration
and other terms of employment for senior management to the annual
general meeting for its approval."3 97 In the Netherlands, it is also
important to note that if a company does not change its pay policy, then it
39 Id.
391' Id.
392 Id.
393 John Tuzyk & Angela Scott, Say-On-Pay Shareholder Voting, BLAKES (June 16, 2009),
http://www.blakes.con/english/view-disc.asp?ID=3207.
3 See Tabaksblat Code, available at httpvww.ecgi~orgfcodes/documents/cgcode-ni-enpdf.
39 Delman, supra note 363, at 593 citing STEPHEN DEANE, WHAT INTERNATIONAL MARKETS
SAY ON PAY: AN INVESTOR PERSPECTIVE 7 (Institutional Shareholder Servs. 2007).
396 Id.
3 Swedish Code of Corporate Governance 4.2.2 (2007), available at httpV/www.ecgi.org/codes/
documents/swedishcLO70913_en.pdf
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does not have to put it to a shareholder vote." However, Sweden,
Norway, and Denmark all mandate binding shareholder votes to be
annual, even when there has been no year-to-year change in principles.'"
VI. CONCLUSION
Shareholders are considered the "owners" of a corporation and
therefore given rights at the expense of other corporation constituents.i
By allowing the shareholders a mechanism to affect executive
compensation, it will allow them to be more involved in the management
of the company. "It is appropriate that shareholders, who ultimately bear
the risk associated with the performance of companies in which they hold
equity, have an opportunity to thoroughly scrutinise remuneration
packages."
The issue of shareholders being able to control executive
compensation will be part of the legal discussion for the foreseeable
future. Paul Hodgson, senior research associate at GMI, said the "sharp
rise in pay was out of line with the relatively modest improvement that
companies typically achieved in profits or share price during 2010."402
Under the proposed "two-strikes" regulation, by allowing shareholders a
stronger voice on how executives are compensated, executive pay might
one day be more in line with company performance.
398 Id.
39 Id.
400 See Karmel, supm note 217.
401 Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Debate, S. House of Representatives, No. 5, 2011
(statement of Rep. Smyth).
4 Chris Isidore, CEO Pay Jumps 36.5%, CNNMONEY.COM (Dec. 15, 2011, 1:49 PM),
http://money.cnn.con2011/12/15/news/companies/ceopay/index.htm.
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